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LEGAL VS. FACTUAL NORMATIVE QUESTIONS
& THE TRUE SCOPE OF RING
EmAD H. ATIQ*
ABSTRACT

When is a normative question a question of law rather than a question offact? The short answer, based on common law and constitutional
rulings, is: it depends. Forexample, if the question concerns thefairness of
contractual terms, it is a question of law. If it concerns the reasonableness
of dangerous risk-taking in a negligence suit, it is a question of fact. If it
concerns the obscenity of speech, it was a question of fact prior to the
Supreme Court's seminal cases on free speech during the 1970s, but is now
treated as law-like. This variance in the case law cannot be explained by
traditionalaccounts of the law/fact distinction and has fueled recent skepticism about the possibility of gleaning a coherent principlefrom judicial
rulings.
This Article clarifies a principle implicit in the settled classifications.
I suggest that judicial practice is consistent: it can be explained by the
distinction between normative questions that are convention-dependent
and those that are convention-independent. Convention-dependent normative questions, or those that turn essentially on facts about our social
practices (roughly, what we do around here) are reasonably classified as
questions of law. By contrast, convention-independent normative questions, which turn instead on fundamental moral norms concerning what
persons are owed simply on account of being persons, are properly classified
as questions of fact. This principle, echoed in recent holdings, clarifies
law/fact classifications in such diverse areas as torts, contracts, First
Amendment law, and criminalprocedure.
The principle also promises to resolve a looming constitutionalcontroversy. In Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that allfactual findings that increase a capital defendant's sentence must be decided by the
jury under the Sixth Amendment. Two recent denials of cert. suggest that
members of the Court wish to revisit, in light of Ring, the constitutionality
* Yale Law School, JD. Princeton University, Dept. of Philosophy, PhD candidate.
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ofjudges decidingwhether a criminal defendant deserves the death penalty.
Applying the principle to Ring, I argue that the question of death-deservingness is a convention-independent normative question, andfor that reason should be deemed a factual question for the jury.
INTRODUCTION

When is a normative or evaluative question that arises at trial a
question of law as opposed to a question of fact?' The short but not
very helpful answer based on judicial rulings is: it depends.2 If the question concerns the reasonableness of an "implied" term in a contract or
the unconscionability of the contract as a whole, it is a question of law. 3
If it concerns the unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct in a
negligent suit, it is a question of fact. 4 In criminal law, whether the
defendant's conduct was especially "cruel" or "heinous" to warrant a
higher penalty is a question of fact for the jury.5 Additionally, there
have been shifts in classification across time. In the context of defamation actions, whether a false statement was made with "actual malice"
1. Described as the "controlling distinction between the power of the court and
that of the jury," Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935), the law/fact distinction
determines whether the judge or jury will decide an issue, the standard of review on
appeal, whether burdens of proof and discovery rules apply, as well as the decision's precedential value. See discussion infra Part I. The maxim that "judges do not answer a question of fact, and juries do not answer a question of law" has been traced to the 16th
century. See Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L.
REv. 1867 (1966) (citing CoKE, COMMENTARY ON LITTLETON 460 (1818)).
The distinction determines factors that powerfully predict a party's likelihood of prevailing on the issue. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial byJury or
judge: TranscendingEmpiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124 (1992) (finding that plaintiffs in
product liability and medical malpractice cases prevail at a much higher rate before
judges than they do before juries). See also Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion
in the Federal Courts: An EmpiricalStudy, 2012 UTAHI L. Rxv. 1, 5 (2012); Kimberly A. Moore,
judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An EmpiricalPeek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365
(2000); Timothy J. Storm, The Standard of Review Does Matter. Evidence ofJudicial Sel'
Restraint in the Illinois Appellate Court, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73 (2009) (finding empirical evidence of a difference in affirmation and reversal rates based on standard of review); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CH. L.
REV. 1371, 1391 (1995) ("Appellate courts have to decide what the 'standard of review' is,
and that standard more often than not determines the outcome.").
2. 1 am specifically interested in the use of the distinction by judges to classify issues
that plain statutory law does not specify as judge or jury issues. How legislatures treat
questions is not the focus of present discussion.
3.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204, cmt. a, c (AM. LAW INsT. 1981);

U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. LAw INST. & UNI. LAw COMM'N 2011). Although the U.C.C.'s
enactment makes contractual unconscionability a question of law by legislative fiat, the
U.C.C.'s drafters drew on the historic practices of common law judges in deciding the
issue. See Donald R. Price, The Conscience ofJudge andjury: Statutory Unconscionability as a
Mixed Question of Law and Fact, 54 TEMPLE L. Q. 743, 745-48 (1981); discussion infra Part

I.B.
4. See Weiner, supra note 1, at 1877 n.43 ("The courts of all American jurisdictions,
with possibly one exception, adhere to this principle .... There are literally hundreds of
cases in which this concept has been asserted."); id. at n.43 (citing cases invoking the
rule); discussion infra Part 1.B.

5. See Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004).
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was traditionally a question of fact reviewed deferentially. 6 But ever
since Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, it is reviewed de novo, the standard

for questions of law.7 A similar shift occurred in the case of obscenity:
whether a publication was "obscene" or "prurient" used to be a paradigmatic question of fact for the jury until the Court's seminal cases on
free speech in the 1970s, when it began to be treated as law-like. 8
The case law presents a puzzle with deceptively high stakes. Judicial practice flatly contradicts standard theories of the common law's
"law/fact" distinction. The dominant view amongst legal theorists is
that the law/fact distinction tracks or maps on to the distinction
between normative and empirical questions. On this view, normative
questions-questions concerning what ought to happen or how persons
ought to behave-are necessarily legal; while all and only empirical
questions-those concerning (roughly) what happened in the worldare factual.9 The first part of my project involves showing that this
dominant view is mistaken: judges in the common law have long treated
some normative questions as legal and others as factual, which suggests
that the law/fact distinction, at least as it has been interpreted by
judges, cuts across the normative domain.' 0 Courts recognizing the difficulty in deriving a coherent principle from the settled classifications
have described the jurisprudence as "elusive," "slippery," and as having
a "vexing nature."" The hard question of interpreting the case law
6. James L. Oakes, ProofofActual Malice in Defamation Actions: An Unsolved Dilemma, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 655, 688-98 (1979) (observing a long history of jury findings on the
question of malice in civil and criminal defamation cases). See discussion infra Part I.C.

7. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501-02 n.27 (1984).
8. SeeJenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 30 (1973); discussion infra Part 1.C. Specifically, the question of whether the depiction of sexual conduct was "patently offensive" came to be treated as law-like.
9. I discuss the empirical-normative distinction more carefully in Part I. Other theories similarly struggle to explain the practice ofjudges-for instance, the view that legal
questions are ones of general applicability whereas factual questions are case-specific or
particular. See discussion infra Part I. The challenge that this part of the case law poses
for traditional theories of the law/fact distinction has been widely discussed in the literature. See RonaldJ. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U.

L. Rev. 1769, 1771 (2003) ("The ubiquitous distinction, despite playing many key doctrinal roles, is muddled to the point of being conceptually meaningless."); Randolph E.
Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARV. L. REv. 753, 812
(1944) ("What is law to one Justice is fact to another, and perhaps vice versa when the
next case comes along."); Robert L. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, judges and
Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARv. L. REv. 70 (1944); Weiner, supra note 1, at 1868
(observing that courts have shown no inclination to fashion definitions of law and fact
which can serve as useful guidelines). Skepticism about the distinction goes back many
decades. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270 (1930); Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed
Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1924); Nathan Isaacs, The Law and the
Facts, 22 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 2 (1922).
10. 1 suspect that the story of how the distinction maps on to the empirical domain
is complicated as well, but I will be concerned solely with the normative domain in what
follows.

11. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 385 (2000); Thompson v. Keohane, 516
U.S. 99, 111 (1995); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982). See also Miller
v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) (observing the difficulty of stating a rule that would
"unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion").
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comes up frequently and with constitutional ramifications: the law/fact
distinction is a trigger for Sixth and Seventh Amendment jury trial
rights. The Supreme Court interprets the scope of the jury trial rights
based on the common law practice of distinguishing essentially legal
from factual questions.'

2

As a result, the issue of how to classify norma-

tive questions under the law/fact distinction has resulted in some controversial decisions.
Consider Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool. 3

In that case, the

majority held that the question of whether punitive damages in an
unfair competition action were proportional or not could be reviewed
de novo as intermediate between law and fact, despite the proportionality question having been historically regarded as a factual question
meant for the jury and reviewed deferentially.' 4 The majority emphasized that punitive damages involve "moral condemnation,"' 5 echoing
the traditional scholastic view that whereas questions of law are normative questions involving "the establishment, disestablishment, modification, or interpretation of legal rules,"' 6 factual questions are those
concerning "who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or
intent."' 7 But asJustice Ginsburg reasonably emphasized in her dissent
in Cooper Industries, normative findings have a long history in the common law of being characterized "as factfindings-e.g., the extent of harm
or potential harm caused by the defendant's misconduct, whether the
defendant acted in good faith,. . . whether the defendant behaved negligently, recklessly, or maliciously."' 8 Whatever one thinks of Justice
Ginsburg's ultimate conclusion in the case, she is surely right that normative questions are often classified as factual in the common law.
More recently, the issue of how normative questions should be classified came up again in two recent denials of cert., from 2013 and 2016,
concerning capital sentencing procedure.' 9 The plaintiffs sought
review of Alabama's practice of letting judges independently decide the
question whether the defendant deserves the death penalty based on
the cumulative weight of the aggravating and mitigating factors in the
defendant's case. Under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona, all

"findings of fact" that increase the severity of a defendant's sentence
must be found by the jury in light of the Sixth Amendment.2 0 The
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
101, 112
17.

See discussion infra Parts I and IV.

Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
Id. at 437.
Id. at 432.
Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7J. APP. PRAcr. & PROC.
(2005).
RcIHAROuJ. PIERCE,JR., 2 ADMIN. LAw TREArISE § 10.5, at 732 (4th ed. 2002). See

J. Allen et al., An External Perspective on the Nature of NonEconomic Compensatory
Damages and their Regulation, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 1249, 1262 (2007) (reciting evidence that
"fact" has historically been understood to concern events in the external world capable of
identification through empirical inquiry).
also Ronald

18.
19.
ing). See
20.
(2000).

Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 407 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissentalso Brooks v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 708 (2016).
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi v. New jersey, 530 U.S. 466
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issue is whether a finding on the death-deservingness question is a
"finding of fact." Although the Court denied cert., Justices Sotomayor
and Breyer wrote a strongly worded dissent from the 2013 cert. denial,
observing that,
[t]he statutorily required finding that the aggravating factors of a
defendant's crime outweigh the mitigating factors is therefore
necessary to impose the death penalty. It is clear, then, that this
factual finding exposes the defendant to a greater punishment
than he would otherwise receive: death, as opposed to life without
parole. Under Apprendi and Ring, a finding that has such an
effect must be made by a jury.2 1
I suspect that the likely sticking point that separates the majority
fromJustices Sotomayor and Breyer is that the question of death-deservingness (and the overall weight of the aggravating and mitigating evidence) is a normative question. The Supreme Court has routinely
emphasized the normative character of this final determination, suggesting that "in the final analysis, capital punishment rests on not a
legal but an ethical judgment-an assessment of .. . the 'moral guilt' of
the defendant." 22 As discussed, such questions are not always treated as
factual. Justices Sotomayor and Breyer did not articulate a reason for
treating the normative question on which the death penalty turns as a
question of fact.23 If there is a principle immanent in the settled classifications that would confirm the Justices' view, it has yet to be
articulated.
This Article argues that there is indeed a useful principle implicit
in the established case law. While this principle may not afford a complete explanation for how judges have treated normative questions, it is
at least part of the explanation for judicial practice and, moreover, the
24
principle should inform future classifications under the distinction.
Judges have been tracking a distinction between two kinds of normative
questions: essentially convention-dependent and convention-independent
21. Woodward, 134 S. Ct. at 410-11.
22. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987) (outlining
the capital jury's task of expressing "the conscience of the community on the ultimate

question of life or death"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 297-98 (1976)
(reflecting on the importance on the moral views of society in the administration of the
death penalty); discussion infra Part IV.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.
24. My preferred methodology for legal theorizing is rational reconstruction or
charitable interpretation. The approach is partly descriptive and partly normative. The
aim is to interpretjudicial behavior in a way that casts judges and their decision-making in
the best possible light. By unifying under relatively simple general principles a disparate
body of case law, we preserve continuity with past practice while also discovering decision
criteria that can be useful going forward. Finding reason in judicial practice, even if it is
not entirely faithful to the actual intentions of all parties involved, is a worthwhile exercise: it serves the important functions of rendering the law more integrated and fostering
respect for law. In other work, I defend the importance of charitable interpretation for
legal systems. A significant virtue of this way of proceeding is that judges seem to rely on
such a method in figuring out what the law is in hard cases, as Ronald Dworkin has
argued.
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normative questions. Conventions can be understood as social practices-roughly "what we do around here" or what norm we actually follow. There are merchant conventions, conventions of legislators and
judges, and conventions of various other sorts. Normative questions are
essentially convention-dependent when they only admit of a determinate answer by appeal to convention facts. When the relevant conventions are inconclusive or ambiguous, such normative questions do not
admit of determinate answers.2 5 By contrast, convention-independent
normative questions do not turn primarily on facts about what we do
around here. They turn instead on, and are determinately answered
by, fundamental moral norms-e.g., those concerning what persons
deserve simply on account of being persons.2 6
This distinction helps explain and rationalize judicial classification
of normative questions as legal or factual. Judges classify normative
questions as legal or factual at some stipulated level of generality. They
classify types of normative questions as legal or factual-e.g., the question of reasonableness in negligence actions, or the question of unconscionability in a contracts dispute.2 7 The relevant question is how likely
is a type of normative question classified under the law/fact distinction
to be essentially convention-dependent or -independent in particular
cases. And the central claim of this Article is that if a type of normative
question is more likely to be convention-independent-that is, if it is
more likely to implicate fundamental moral norms-then it is reasonably classified as a question of fact. Juries are well suited to deciding
such questions. By contrast, there are sound conceptual and pragmatic
reasons for classifying as legal those types of normative questions that
are likely to be essentially convention-dependent. 28 There are echoes
25. Convention-dependent norms, I argue, tend to be ones that (1) concern the
distribution of benefits and burdens that do not implicate matters of fundamental right,
(2) solve moral problems that require large-scale collective action, and (3) arise in contexts where a paramount concern is respecting the expectations of participants in a
convention.
26. These admit of determinate answers, either by appeal to fundamental moral
facts alone, or on the basis of the fundamental moral facts plus facts about our
conventions.
27. The law, as Lee Fennell notes, is lumpy: it operates through general rules of
thumb. Lee A. Fennell, Lumpy Propery, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 1955 (2012). My view predicts
howjudges will classify a type of normative question, once the type (or level of generality)
has already been chosen by judges. For example, the category "unconscionability in a
contracts dispute" is a more general category than "unconscionability in mortgage contract disputes." The classification of questions of unconscionability as legal has occurred
at the more general level of contracts disputes. The distinction between types of questions and particular tokens or instances is worth bearing in mind in what follows. Just
because there are instances of a type that are convention-dependent, this does not settle
whether the type is more likely to be convention-dependent or -independent. In followup work, I explore instances where it might be better for courts to ask the conventiondependent/-independent (law/fact) question at a different level of generality-in particular, at a more fine-grained level.
28. See discussion infra Part II. The conceptual argument appeals to what distinguishes essentially legal from pure moral normativity-the former's at least partial dependence on social conventions-drawing on a point of relative consensus in legal
philosophy. Both in ordinary language and within the law, we recognize different varieties of normativity (legal, moral, semantic). The pragmatic argument emphasizes,
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of this principle in court opinions. 29 But its primary virtue is that it
promises to explain the practice of common law judges.
The principle explains, inter alia, the contrasting treatment of key
reasonableness questions in torts and contracts. The question whether
a factory owner behaved reasonably in failing to implement safety protocols that could have prevented severe injuries suffered by her employees is a different kind of question from whether a price term in a
contract is reasonable. Reasonableness norms governing dangerous
risk-taking often turn not simply on conventional facts, but, as Gregory
Keating writes, on "rights and obligations that attach to persons simply
as persons."30 One reason why basic moral rights are often implicated in
negligence cases is that such cases routinely involve harms to interests
that have a special moral priority, including "the interests in one's own
physical health and vigor, the integrity and normal functioning of one's
body, the absence of absorbing pain and suffering or grotesque disfigurement." 3 ' Given the harms at stake, it is reasonable to assume that
basic moral rights bear on what constitutes reasonable risk-taking. Of
course, conventions may also bear on the issue, but they are not independently determinative of the normative question. Plausibly, the relevant conventions are themselves the result of agents trying to do what
they morally ought to do and are thus indicative of background pre32
Basic moral rights and obligations are
conventional moral norms.
sufficiently implicated in negligence actions to rationalize the classification of the reasonableness of dangerous risk-taking as a question of fact.
By contrast, the reasonableness of an implied price term in a contract is not the sort of question that can be settled independently of
conventions or by appeal to basic moral principles. If there are no set
conventions in place regarding how to price widgets, there will simply
among other things, thatjudges have a special competence to decide normative questions
that turn on conventions (law-related or otherwise), but it is unlikely and at the very least
highly controversial that they have any special expertise over the jury in deciding fundamental questions of moral fact.
Although I have put the principle in terms of a purely statistical notion of likelihood,
the issue may involve more than mere likelihood. The relevant question might be
whether a question is sufficiently likely to implicate matters of basic right and wrong.
29. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
501 n.16 (1984) (justifying de novo review in cases where a normative finding "cannot
escape broadly social judgments"). Though it might seem like my theory gets things backwards-convention-independent norms appear more robustly normative than convention-dependent norms, after all-it does not. When pure moral questions are implicated
under the law, answers to such questions cannot and should not be deemed legal, or so I
argue. Moreover, the social or convention-dependent character of legal norms does not
make them any less normative. Finally, my analysis rejects the values vs. facts view of the
law/fact distinction. See discussion infra Parts I and II.
30. Gregory C. Keating, Is the Role of Tort to Repair Wrongful Losses?, in RIGHTS AND
PRIVATE LAw 367, 383 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012) (emphasis added).
31. JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME 1: HARM TO
OTHERS 37 (1987).
32. There is an important difference between the way conventions bear on what is
reasonable in torts-they play an evidential role, indicating background moral normsand the way non-moral conventions independently determine contractual norms. See discussion infra Part III.A and n.195.
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be no determinate fact of the matter as to what constitutes a "reasonable price" to be implied by the court within a broad range of possible
prices, when parties forget to settle on a price term. This is because the
distribution of benefits and burdens stemming from voluntary trade
does not implicate interests of foundational moral importance. More
generally, in the economic context, judges reasonably regard questions
concerning the reasonableness of implied contractual terms and overall
contractual unconscionability as essentially convention-dependent-as
determined by merchant and regulatory conventions. The modern
marketplace is quite plausibly an arena of relaxed interpersonal expectations, with conventions of self-interested and even predatory behavior
having displaced pre-conventional moral norms of good behavior.3 3
Thus, judges will frequently refer to the unique "morals of the market
place" 3 4 and refuse to "impose ... duties higher than the morals of the
marketplace." 3 5
I use the framework to explain other aspects of the case law on
legal and factual normative questions. But its prescriptive upshot for
the impending capital sentencing controversy discussed earlier warrants
special emphasis. The analysis bolsters the case for the unconstitutionality of judges issuing death sentences independently of juries. The
question of whether a criminal defendant deserves to be executed is
paradigmatically not the kind of question that can be affirmatively
answered by appeal to social convention facts. An affirmative answer to
the question of death-deservingness implicates fundamental questions
of fairness and basic dignity.3 6 Moreover, the Court has regularly
emphasized the foundational ethical character of this final determination, and that it must be a "reasoned moral response to the defendant's
background, character, and crime." 37 Members of the Court recognize
that the law demands moral deliberation from the sentencer, that the
life-or-death decision is a question concerning the defendant's "moral
entitlement to live," 38 and that it must be based on a "moral inquiry
into [his] culpability."3 9 These holdings can be interpreted as standing
for the proposition that the normative question on which the death
penalty ultimately rests is a convention-independent moral question.
Accordingly, given the framework I outline, it is a question of fact. To
the extent that the common law rule controls in this case (and I argue
that it does, or at least weighs heavily) there is a strong argument to be
made that only juries can affirmatively answer the question of death40
deservingness.
33. See discussion infra Part II.
34. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
35. Lee v. LPP Mortg. Ltd., 74 P.3d 152, 162 (Wyo. 2003).
36. See discussion infra Parts II and IV.
37. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989).
38. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 469 (1984).
39. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. A negative answer-that is, a determination that life and not death is warranted-can be made by judge and jury, I argue. An affirmative answer needs to overcome basic moral constraints. A negative answer does not and can be based on a social
practice of mercy and forgiveness.
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Part I explains the basic role of the law/fact distinction and its significance within the common law and constitutional law. It also
describes traditional theories of the distinction and the challenges facing these theories using settled law/fact classifications in torts, contracts, criminal procedure, and First Amendment law. Part II
introduces and defends an alternative theoretical framework for understanding the law/fact distinction as it has been interpreted by courts:
the difference between convention-dependent and convention-independent norms.4 ' Part III demonstrates the framework's potential for
explaining how judges have handled normative questions. Part IV is
primarily prescriptive, focusing on the framework's material implications for the scope of Ring, the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, and
the unconstitutionality of Alabama judges independently deciding
42
whether a criminal defendant deserves the death penalty.

I.

How

COURTS

DEAL WITH NORMATIVITY UNDER

THE LAw/FACT DISTINCTION

There are two strands of case law on the law/fact issue that should
be distinguished. There is, on the one hand, a line of Supreme Court
cases interpreting the scope of the Sixth and Seventh Amendment
rights to have juries decide questions of fact in civil and criminal
cases. 4 3 The constitutional case law is concerned not just with distinguishing factual questions from legal ones but with determining
whether a question of fact must be decided by the jury for constitutional
purposes. 44 By contrast, the common law practice of distinguishing
questions of law from questions of fact is not necessarily directed at
satisfying constitutional requirements. The primary goal of the com-

&

41. I am primarily interested in the principles immanent in the behavior of common law judges-that is, the wisdom of the common law judge. My account does not
address how or why legislatures have assigned questions to judge or jury.
42. Recent cases suggest that members of the Court believe the practice of judges
independently sentencing defendants to death is headed for a constitutional challenge.
See discussion infra Part IV. On April 11th, 2017, Alabama governor Kay Ivey signed into
law a bill banning judges from independently sentencing to death defendants convicted
after April 11th, but the law does not apply retroactively to defendants convicted before
April 11th. Act of April 11th, 2017, 2017 Ala. Laws 178947-3 (codified as amended at ALA.
CODE §§ 13A-5-45, 13A-5-46, and 13A-5-47). Judges remain free to exercise the "life-todeath override" for pre-April 11th murder convictions. The legislation will not affect the
183 inmates currently on Alabama's death row. Alabama judges have overriddenjury life
sentences 112 times since 1976. See Alabama Ends Death Penalty by Judicial Override, AssoctATED PRESs (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/alabama/arti7
cles/201 -04-11/alabama-ends-death-penalty-by-judicial-override.
43. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law."). The Sixth Amendment in relevant part
states "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. See also Allen
Pardo, supra note 9, at 1779; discussion infra Parts I.B, I.C.
44. Welsh White makes a similar point regarding the importance of distinguishing
the two lines ofjurisprudence. Welsh S. White, Fact-finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope
of a Capital Defendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. Rsv. 1, 4-5 (1989).
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mon law practice is to allocate decision-making responsibilities between
judge and jury in a principled way and set a standard of review when
plain statutory law and the Constitution are silent as to whether ajudge
or jury should decide a question that arises at trial.4 5
This is an important difference to bear in mind in what follows.
While the common law distinction guides judges on the allocative question, it is not always considered decisive. Courts will, for example,
sometimes reserve for judges the responsibility of deciding a factual
question for pragmatic reasons.4 6 Alternatively, paradigmatic questions
of fact may be assigned to judges by legislative fiat. By contrast, the
constitutional question is a question of right when must a plaintiff or
defendant be afforded the right to have juries decide a question of fact
raised at trial? The constitutional and common law rulings on law and
fact are related, however. The Supreme Court regards the common law
practice of treating an issue as factual or legal as a factor in deciding the
constitutional question. 4 7 Nevertheless, it is important to keep the two
lines of jurisprudence separate, given that the constitutional analysis
turns on more than just the law/fact issue. It is also worth bearing in
mind that our concern is solely with judicial practice-that is, how
judges have interpreted the law/fact distinction; it is not necessarily
with the behavior of, say, legislatures in assigning questions to judges or
juries.
The procedure for deciding the Seventh Amendment question
involves the Court determining, first, whether a right to a jury trial
exists for the overall cause of action.4 8 If the right exists, the Court
engages in a historical inquiry to see whether a specific question arising
in the case would have been assigned to the jury in 1791, when the
Amendment was ratified. 4 9 If the historical inquiry is inconclusive, the
Court examines a wide variety of factors, including prudential and
"functional" considerations, in deciding whether to mandate jury
involvement.5 0 The functional analysis takes into account judicial practice as well as conceptual differences between questions of law and

45. See discussion infra Part IB; Weiner supra note 1, at 1867-68 (describing state
statutes that leave it to judges to define what 'law' and 'fact' mean). See alo OtIvER W.
HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAw 122-27 (1881).

46. See White, supra note 44 (noting thatjudges make factual findings in the evaluation of evidence). Pragmatic considerations even give rise to a "complexity exception" to
the Seventh Amendment right to have juries decide issues of fact. See, e.g., In re Boise
Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
47. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 599 (2002) (citing approvingly the work of
Welsh White); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996). See abo
White, supra note 44, at 4-5 (observing that English legal scholars and the common law
understanding of the distinction between law and fact "undoubtedly influenced the
framers").

48.
49.

See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987).
See Chauffeurs Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990) for the two-prong

test. See also Allen & Pardo, supra note 9, at 1779.
50. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 9, at 1779.
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fact.5 ' The key point, which will be demonstrated at length in what
follows, is that both constitutional and common law rulings have been
guided by the assumption that the conceptual distinction between legal
and factual questions is both objective and related to the pragmatic
52
question of who-judge or jury-is better placed to decide the issue.
A.

Traditional Conceptions of Law and Fact: Normative vs.
Empirical, General vs. Particular

Before getting to the case law concerning normative questions, it
will be helpful to have theories of the law/fact distinction on hand. On
a widely-embraced view, questions of fact are empirical or historicalquestions concerning "who did what, where, when, how, why, with what
intent or motive," 53 while questions of law are normative questions
involving "the establishment, disestablishment, modification, or interpretation of legal rules." 54 Judge Richard Posner provides the example
of questions about what happened during the reign of Richard III.
These have a different "ontological status" from questions about rules
or norms derived from statutes, judicial opinions, and other such
55
Similarly, Richard Friedman suggests that
sources, which are legal.
determining or describing some part of
involves
"fact-finding"
ordinary
reality, whereas "law-discovery" always involves interpreting normative
56
The normative vs. empirical
standards, such as: "cruel and unusual."
at
times been cited approvingly by
conception of the law/fact divide has
57
the Supreme Court.
Most modern theorists acknowledge that legal questions remain
factual at least in one sense-namely, there can be a determinate fact of
51. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437
(2001) (describing historical facts as paradigmatically factual and legal questions as essentially normative).
52. It would be surprising if the conceptual distinction that judges have used did
not serve the practicalend of allocating questions between judge and jury in a useful way.
Any account of the conceptual distinction should explain why the distinction is practically
useful. But on this analytic approach, the order of explanation runs from the conceptual
distinction to the pragmatic justification, not the other way.
53. PIERCE, supra note 17, at 732. See also Allen et al. supra note 17, at 1262 (2007)
(reciting evidence that "fact" has historically been understood to concern events in the
external world capable of identification through empirical inquiry).
54. Warner, supra note 16, at 112.
55. Rici-tARo A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 198 (1990).
56. Friedman, infra note 58, at 918. See aLbo Bohlen, supra note 9, at 112 ("[Law is
defined as a] body of principles and rules which are capable of being predicated in
advance . . . awaiting proof of the facts necessary for their application."); Arthur W.

Phelps, Wat is a "Question ofLaw", 18 U. CIN. L. REv. 259, 259 (1949) ("([A] legal system
which postulates norms (roughly, rules and principles of law) must make some differentiation between a norm and the question of the existence of the facts which call for its
application.").
57. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437
(2001) ("Unlike the measure of actual damages suffered, which presents a question of
historical . . . fact, the level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury."
(citations omitted) (quoting Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 459

(1996) (Scalia J., dissenting)). But see id. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the matter regarding what the law is on some issue.58 The law/fact
distinction should be understood in terms of the difference between
questions concerning legal facts, on the one hand, and non-legal facts
on the other. The relevant question for theorists is what distinguishes
legal from non-legal facts. It could, for example, have something to do
with the difference between empirical and normative facts.
A related account distinguishes non-legal from legal facts based on
their degree of specificity or particularity. Such an account can allow
normative findings to count as "factual" so long as they are highly particular, for instance, a finding that a defendant was negligent based on
a rich and complex combination of factors that were true in the individual case. By contrast, more general normative truths are law-like. They
concern what is true in a wide range of cases, for instance, that a failure
to comply with a statutory requirement designed to protect persons
from harm is negligence per se.
Proponents of both the normative/empirical and general/specific
accounts of the distinction tend to concede that "law" and "fact" may
not be binaries. There may be types of questions that are not easily
classified as either legal or factual because they resemble both.5 9 What
legislatures intend to do appears to be a historical/empirical fact. Yet
legislative intent is paradigmatically a question of law decided by judges
in the course of interpreting statutory language. Thus, Henry
Monaghan writes that the "distinction posited between 'law' and 'fact'
does not imply the existence of static, polar opposites. Rather, law and
fact have a nodal quality; they are points of rest and relative stability on
a continuum of experience."6 0
The "mixed" status of certain questions needn't be a mark against
a theory of the distinction. Many of our ordinary concepts track genuine differences in the world, even while failing to determinately apply in
borderline cases. There may not be a fact of the matter regarding
whether persons in an intermediate stage of hair loss count as bald or
not, but that does not mean that there isn't a genuine difference
between those who are bald and those who aren't. The crucial question
for theorists is whether the features that determine whether a type of
question is more legal than factual can be specified ex ante. The theo58.

See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasionand the Distinction Between

Fact and Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 917 (1992) (noting that the relevant difference is
between legal and non-legal facts); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Riview, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 229, 235 (1985). See also Allen & Pardo, supra note 9, at 1792-94 ("[T]he
answers to legal questions are propositional statements with truth value and are therefore,
like other propositions with truth value, factual . . . . One can be objectively right or
wrong about the rules of basketball or chess even though these are also human-made,
linguistic constructs."). The law/fact distinction tracks questions concerning legal facts,
on the one hand, and non-legal facts, on the other (the current use of "fact" in discussing
the distinction will follow this usage, with "non-legal" occasionally added for emphasis).
Thanks to Nomi Stolzenberg for pressing me to make this clear.
59. See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, 'Facts' and 'Statements of Fact,'4 U. Ci-n. L. REV.
233, 244 (1937) ("[T]he time-honored distinction between 'statements of fact' and 'conclusions of law' is merely one of degree. . . ."); Monaghan, supra note 58, at 233 n.24.
60. Monaghan, supra note 58, at 233. See also Warner, supra note 16.
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retical challenge is to say precisely which features characterize the
"nodes" and, accordingly, determine where on the continuum between
legality and factuality a question lies. The relevant features may be generality or normativity, but the account should ideally square with the
actual practice of judges tasked with interpreting the distinction.
B.

The Domain Relative Treatment of Normative Questions

The trouble with existing accounts of the distinction is that they
struggle to explain the actual case law.6 1 The theory that normative
questions are necessarily legal is hard to reconcile with the numerous
cases in which normative issues are classified as questions of fact. In
tort law, for example, it is a firmly entrenched rule that whether the
defendant acted unreasonably and thereby breached a duty of care
62
owed to the plaintiff is a question of fact for the jury. Jury instructions
a reasonably caresay
what
not
law
does
he
"[t]
routinely emphasize that
6 Instead,
6.3.
ful person using ordinary care would or would not do .
juries are responsible both for articulating the norm governing reasonable and unreasonable behavior in the context of subjecting others to
risk and for applying the norm to the facts of the case. While the question of fact status of the negligence issue attracts a fair bit of academic
criticism, including from those who think normative questions are necessarily questions of law, the Supreme Court has endorsed the classification, hinting that the important values at stake and the prevalence of
reasonable disagreement on what constitutes negligence is part of the
justification.6 4 Other concepts in the tort context, like "proximate causation," whose application and interpretation are assigned to the jury,
often turn out to be "cryptonormative"-that is, concepts whose appli65
cation non-obviously involves determining normative questions.
Whether the defendant's conduct proximately caused the plaintiffs
injury can turn, among other things, on whether the injury was reasonably foreseeable. 6 6
The treatment of normative questions as questions of fact is not
confined to tort law. In criminal law, juries decide, often by constitutional mandate, such questions as whether the defendant's conduct was
61. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 9, at 1800-06.
62. See Weiner, supra note 1, at 1877, 1877 n.43 ("The courts of all American jurisdictions, with possibly one exception, adhere to this principle . . . . There are literally
hundreds of cases in which this concept has been asserted."); id. at 1877 n.43 (citing cases
invoking the rule).
63. Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell juries about Negligence: A
Review of PatternJury Instructions, 77 CHi. KErNT. L. REv. 587, 608 (2002).
64. For critics of the common-law treatment of negligence, see Allen & Pardo, supra
note 9, at 1781 n.76. See also Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657 (1873)
(endorsing the question of fact status of negligence).
65.

Patrick

J.

Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present

Darkness, 69 WASi-. U. L. Q. 49, 51 (1991) (discussing the view that "proximate cause has
nothing to do with causation and little to do with proximity" and instead refers to the
"scope of duty in negligence cases"). On cryptonormative judgments generally, see Alex
Worsnip, CryptonormativeJudgments, 25 EUR. J. OF PHIL. 3 (2017).
66. See Kelley, supra note 65.
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especially "cruel" or "heinous," which involves determining the normative significance of empirical facts (like the use of a type of weapon or
injuries to bystanders).67 Indeed, virtually all "sentencing factors" or
factors used to increase sentences beyond statutory maximums have
question-of-fact status under constitutional law. In an important line of
cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial includes the
right to have the jury decide all questions of fact, including those concerning the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors that increase
the maximum sentence the defendant can receive from that allowed by
a finding of guilt alone. 68 More recently, in Alleyne v. United States, the
Court held explicitly that the finding of virtually any fact that increases
a punishment in any way, including the statutory minimum, is a fact
that must be found by the jury. 69
In the capital sentencing context, jury-findings of "aggravating"
and "mitigating" factors determine whether the defendant receives the
death penalty. 70 In nearly all states that allow the death penalty, juries
play a decisive (and often final) role in determining whether a capital
defendant should be sentenced to death, based on a weighing of mitigating against aggravating factors. 7 ' The Court has emphasized the
normative character of this final determination, suggesting that "in the
final analysis, capital punishment rests on not a legal but an ethical
judgment-an assessment of . .. the moral guilt of the defendant." 7 2
67. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) ("[T]he 'statutory maximum' . . . is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.") (emphasis omitted). The
Court found thejudge's finding of "deliberate cruelty" at sentencing to be an unconstitutional invasion of thejury's fact-finding role. Id. at 313-14. For a discussion of the trend
of greaterjury involvement in sentencing, seeW. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel:
Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of]Punishment, 109 Cotum. L. REv. 893,
902 (2009); Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to ajury Decision on Sentencing facts after Booker: What
the Seventh Amendment Can Teach the Sixth, 39 GA. L. Rev. 895 (2005).

68. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243-44 (2005) (validating Apprendi
and extending it to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,
589 (2002) ("Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants ... are entitled to a
jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their
maximum punishment."); Apprendi v. New jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
69. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013) (holding that any fact that increases the mandatory
minimum must be submitted to the jury including normative findings of fact).
70. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (holding that aggravating factors present a question of
fact for the jury). See also Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven": Mercy in
CapitalSentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 989, 1003 n.56 (1996) ("Capital sentencing juries
are said to represent the 'conscience of the community.' However, they 'represent' the
community only because they are members of the community, not because they discern
and then apply community standards.").
71. In 27 of the current 32 death penalty states, the jury's decision to sentence a
defendant to life imprisonment is final and cannot be overridden by a trial judge. See
Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 407 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
72. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987) (outlining
the capital jury's task of expressing "the conscience of the community on the ultimate
question of life or death"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 297-98 (1976)
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Cases such as these strongly suggest that question-of-law status is
unlikely to be a function merely of a question's normative character.
Upon reflection, it is indeed hard to see why, given that in ordinary
language we find it helpful to distinguish different types of normative
questions (legal, moral, epistemic), every normative question raised
under the law would be, simply for being normative, a legal question.
For instance, we distinguish moral questions from questions of etiquette or prudence.
It is also not the case that those who support the normative/empirical theory have the distinction backwards: the case law offers many
examples of normative questions classified as legal. 73 Contract law, and
more generally laws governing conduct by economic actors (such as
74
Judges are
unfair competition law), provide several illustrations.
often asked to fill the gaps in contracts with "implied terms," and in
75
Thus,
doing so draw upon considerations of fairness/reasonableness.
§ 204 of the Restatement explicitly directs courts to imply 76terms that
comport with "community standards of fairness and policy," and § 2204(3) of the U.C.C. says courts should supply terms if "there is a rea77
Courts
sonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."
acknowledge that the reasonableness of implied terms is a question of
78
In
law just as universally as they do that it is a normative question.
(reflecting on the importance of the moral views of society in the administration of death

penalty); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) ("[A] jury that must choose
between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more-and must do
nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of
life or death.").
73. For a comparison of the treatment of normative issues in torts and contracts,
see Mark P. Gergen, The jury's Role in DecidingNormative Issues in the American Common Law,
68 FORDI-tAM L. REv. 407 (1999). The disparate treatment of normative issues under the
law/fact distinction has been widely commented on. See, e.g., Allen & Pardo, supra note 9,
at 1781-83; Gergen, supra note 73; Weiner, supra note 1, at 1893-95.
74. See generally William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law Distinction)
in the Interpretationof Witten Contracts, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 931 (2001).
75. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 9, at 1782; Gergen, supra note73, at 443; Charles
T. McCormick, The Parole Evidence Rule as a ProceduralDevice for Control of the jury, 41 YALE

L.J. 365 (1932).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204, cmt. d. (AM. LAw INST. 1981).
77. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIE. LAw COMM'N 2011).
78. Judge Posner observes that "whether we say that a contract shall be deemed to
contain such implied conditions as are necessary to make sense of the contract, or that a
contract obligates the parties to cooperate in its performance in 'good faith' to the extent
necessary to carry out the purposes of the contract, comes to much the same thing." Mkt.

St. Assoc. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1991). See also Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727
F.2d 1145, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1984); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 75 (1981) ("[I]t
seems as if contractual relations depend not on the will of the parties but on externally
imposed substantive moral judgments of what the relations between the parties should
be."); Randy E. Barnett, . . . And Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 421, 427
(1993); Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The ReasonablePerson Standardand

the Subjectivity ofJudgment, 48 S.C. L. REv. 293, 298 (1997) ("The reasonable person, under
the banner of sanctity of contract or that of fairness, is used to fill gaps in otherwise
inchoate contracts."); id. at 299 ("The implication of society's rules of fairness and reasonableness is generally accomplished through the courts' fabrication of the reasonable person."); Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in ContractInterpretationand Gap-

Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 559, 616 (2012) (observing three
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Pennsylvania, for instance, the doctrine of "necessary implication" states
that "[i] n the absence of an express term, [this doctrine] ... may act to
imply a requirement necessitated by reason and justice without which the

intent of the parties is frustrated."7 9
Similarly, the "unconscionability" of contractual terms is a question
of law.80 Judges can refuse to enforce a contract deemed unconscionable. According to the U.C.C.,
[t]he basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract.... The principle is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise .... .s
This manifestly normative enquiry involves appraisal of both the
procedural fairness of a contract, having to do with symmetry of information and bargaining strength of the contracting parties, as well as
substantive fairness, having to do with the relative gains and losses allocated to either side. 82 Although the U.C.C.'s enactment makes contractual unconscionability a question of law by legislative fiat, the U.C.C.'s
drafters drew on the historic practices of common law judges in deciding the issue. As Donald Price notes, juries were excluded from unconscionability determinations well before the issue was legislatively
assigned to judges.8 3
Another helpful example is the treatment of punitive damages in
economic contexts. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,

Inc., which involved unfair competition and false advertising claims, the
jury awarded $4.5 million in punitive damages, and the issue on appeal
categories of implied terms including "terms imposed by the court for reasons of policy or

fairness, or in obedience to rules of law.").
79. Emily M. S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty
Vessel?, 2005 Utah L. Rev. 1, 15 (discussing doctrine of "necessary implication" as refer-

enced in Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
80. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2011) ("If the court as a
matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract . . . ."); U.C.C.
§ 2-302(2) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2011). See also Landsman Packing Co. v.
Cont'l. Can Co., 864 F.2d 721, 729 (11th Cir. 1989) (reversing lower court's decision to
allow the jury to decide unconscionability).
81. UCC § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2011). It is also
important to note that an unconscionability finding by a judge is not equivalent to a
finding that no reasonable juror could find the contract conscionable. It is a determination made entirely at the judge's discretion and not controlled by whether reasonable
persons might disagree.
82. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTI-H, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRAcTs (1990) (defining procedural unconscionability in terms of the "absence of meaningful choice on the part of one
of the parties"); MARCARETJ. RADIN, BOILERPIATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAw 125 (2013) ("[s]ubstantive unconscionability refers to defects in the

bargain itself: the notion that some contracts may look so one-sided or unequal or oppressive that the court in good conscience simply should not tolerate enforcing them");
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.

REV. 485 (1967).
83.

Price, supra note 3, at 745-48.
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was the appropriate standard of review in assessing the damages
awarded for proportionality.8 4 The Supreme Court held that de novo
review-the standard for questions of law-was appropriate for the proportionality of punitive damages. It deemed the finding of punitive
damages to have intermediate status between law and fact, noting in
85
As we have
particular the element of moral condemnation involved.
noted, however, moral findings, including those involving condemnation of a defendant's conduct, are routinely treated as factual and
reviewed deferentially, a fact that Justice Ginsburg emphasized in her
dissent in Cooper.86 For reasons not entirely clear, the moral condemnation in this instance and the normative question raised at trial was
deemed to be law-like.
If the normative/empirical account of the distinction fails to
explain the case law, the general/specific account does not fare much
better. Proponents of the latter view think that normative issues are
questions of law when they implicate general as opposed to specific normative considerations. However, it is far from obvious that contractual
norms interpreted and applied by judges have a greater degree of gen87
There have
erality than those arising in the tort and criminal context.
been few attempts to unify under general normative rules' findings of
88
In fact, scholarship
contractual unconscionability or reasonableness.
case-specific nature
highly
the
to
emphasize
tends
unconscionability
on
of the enquiry. 89 Courts seem to agree: "the precise number of days ...
which will constitute a 'reasonable time,' . . . depend[s] upon circumstances as variable and uncertain as are the transactions and characters
of men; and finally to be determined by the discretion, not to say,
caprice of the Court." 90 Moreover, normative questions classified as
factual do seem to be decided under general moral principles. For
instance, jurors in criminal sentencing seem to decide issues on the
basis of general maxims, as evidenced by patterns in the treatment of
84. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 426 (2001).
85. Id. at 437.
86. Id. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
87. See sources cited supra note 9.
88. See, e.g., M. Neil Browne & Lauren Biksacky, Unconscionabilityand the Contingent
Assumptions of Contract Theory, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REv. 211, 222 ("Procedural unconscionability can result from any of the following elements: (1) absence of meaningful choice;
(2) superiority of bargaining power; (3) the fact that the contract is an adhesion contract;
(4) unfair surprise; or (5) sharp practices and deception."); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking
Some Myths about Unconscionability:A New Frameworkfor U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L.
Rv. 1 (1981).
89. Browne & Biksacky, supra note 88, at 215-16 (arguing that the policing of
unconscionability by the courts has been "inherently contradictory ... since the inception
of the doctrine").
90. Goodwin v. Davenport, 47 Me. 112, 117-18 (Me. 1860) (emphasis omitted). See
aLso A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. Strough, 103 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1996) (invalidating a geographical limitation on competition for unreasonableness and supplying a new limitation); Seaver v. Lincoln, 38 Mass. 267, 268-69 (Mass. 1838) (noting that "one decision
goes but little way in establishing a precedent for another"); Commercial Nat'l Bank v.
Zimmerman, 185 N.E. 210, 217 (N.Y. 1906) ("[W]hat constitutes reasonableness of time
... cannot be determined by any fixed rules."); U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2011); RESTATEMENr
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (AM. LAw INST. 1981).
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emotional disturbance and severe environmental deprivation (or SED)
evidence. 9 ' It is, to say the least, a controversial notion that the varying
classification of normative questions as legal or factual is to be
explained in terms of differences in the generality or specificity of the
normative truths in question.
There has been a tendency amongst theorists to treat the case law
that is hard to square with theory as exceptional in one of two ways.
The more common approach has been to acknowledge inconsistencies
and explain them as cases of judges ignoring the law/fact distinction
for case-specific pragmatic reasons but failing to do so explicitly. 92 For
instance, a judge may refer to what is really a question of fact as a legal
question if she feels that judges are uniquely qualified to decide the
issue. Randall Warner suggests that "evaluative determinations" are
"special" and classification by judges of an evaluative issue as law or fact
does not turn on the essence of the law/fact distinction but instead on
"a policy choice concerning the judicial actor better positioned to
decide a particular issue."9 3 What lends support to this view is the frequency with which judges justify their classificatory choices by appeal to
prudential considerations. In deeming a question to be one of law,
judges appeal to factors like the complexity of an issue or the need for
uniformity and predictability. 9 4 They might also appeal to the importance of bringing community sentiment to bear on an issue in assigning
a question to the jury.95 It is far from obvious whether such pragmatic
concerns have anything to with the essential difference between legal
and factual questions.96
91. See Michelle E. Barnett et al., When MitigationEvidence Makes a Difference: Effects of
Psychological MitigatingEvidence on Sentencing Decisions in Capital Tiah, 22 BEHAv. Sc. & L.
751 (2004) (finding that mock jurors are less likely to assign a death sentence in light of
SED evidence); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do

Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1564-66 (1998) (finding based on empirical study
that mental or emotional disturbance is treated as highly mitigating and poverty and deprivation are assigned mitigating weight by half ofjurors).
92. See, e.g., Bohlen, supra note 9, at 115 (arguing that assignment of the negligence
issue to juries is not based on strict application of the law/fact rule); Friedman, supra note
58, at 922 ("We should not be fooled [by negligence]. The jury in such a case does more
than determine an aspect of reality. It also determines the norms that will be applied in
that case."); Oliver W. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REV. 443, 457
(1899) ("I venture to think . . . that every time that a judge declines to rule whether
certain conduct is negligent or not he avows his inability to state the law ... if a question
of law is pretty clear we can decide it, as it is our duty to do, if it is difficult it can be
decided better by twelve men taken at random from the street."); Monaghan, supra note
58, at 232 n.22 ("[T]he allocation of negligence questions to the jury rests on grounds of
policy, not on abstract conceptions of the intrinsic nature of the question itself."); id. at
234-35 ("The difficulty comes when the judges seek to force such [pragmatic] allocation
decisions into the conventional categories of law and fact. Distortions in the analytic
content of the categories occur."). See also Antilles S.S. Co. v. Members of Am. Hull Ins.

Syndicate, 733 F.2d 195, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concurring) (arguing that
negligence is left to the jury for practical reasons).
93. Warner, supra note 16, at 130.
94. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996).

95.

See, e.g., Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873).

96.

See Allen & Pardo, supra note 9, at 1782.
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There are several reasons why theorists should resist the temptation to explain away difficult case law as judges, letting prudential considerations that are both case-specific and unhinged from the
conceptual differences between legal and factual questions, guide classification. The case law keeps legal theorizing from devolving into datafree speculation. It is therefore important to try and explain as much of
it as one can by appealing to general theory. If judges routinely use
case-specific pragmatic analysis rather than the analytic distinction to
decide the law/fact issue, then this raises the possibility that the analytic
distinction itself does no real work. Instead, "law" and "fact" may just be
labels judges use to indicate their independently reached pragmatic
conclusions regarding who should decide an issue. As Allen and Pardo
write, "[t]he extent to which pragmatic considerations determine the
allocative question is plain in these areas .... [B]ut this does not make
'legal' issues out of factual issues. . . ."9 The pragmatic considerations
may have an important role to play in reinforcing classification. But
our theory of legality and factuality should be consistent with as much
of the difficult case law as possible.
Another reason that the pragmatic account of the controversial
cases is less than satisfying is that the prudential reasons cited for
98
assigning an issue to the judge or jury tend be less than persuasive.
Take, for instance, the view that judges' expertise at interpreting written documents makes them especially good at discerning the reasonableness of implied contractual terms, given the central role of the
explicit contractual language in determining such reasonableness. In
cases of genuine gap-filling, there is often no clear language in the contract that speaks to the issue, and judges must rely on considerations
unrelated to exegesis, including the going rates in the industry and
their own sense of fairness. Similarly, it is often claimed that judges
tend to be uniform in their decisions, which results in greater predictability. Yet there are reasons to doubt that this holds true. The
99
research suggests that juries are often as predictable as judges.
A different approach that is sometimes taken by theorists in
response to the differential treatment of normative questions is to treat
them as "mixed questions of law and fact," or questions that share fea00
As discussed
tures of both and can therefore be classified as either.'
earlier, an analytic theory of the law/fact distinction can accommodate
"mixed questions," as well as the idea that questions can have both lawlike as well as factual characteristics. Crucially, however, the theorist
needs an account of the features in virtue of which a question counts as
97. Id. at 1783.
98. Id. at 1782 ("The second rationale for this rule-administrative concerns-involves
the need for uniformity and predictability with frequently reoccurring fact patterns ....
No justification has been given, however, as to why this only applies to contracts and not
to other areas such as negligence, or any other area for that matter.").
99. See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEwis & CLuuK L. REV. 231 (arguing, based on empirical studies, that the
transfer of patent claim construction from a question of fact for the jury to one of law for
the judge has not made the law more predictable).
100. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 16.
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mixed. In other words, the theory needs to explain what determines
the more law-like character of normative fact-finding in the contractual
or economic domain, for example, than that of normative fact-finding
in capital sentencing proceedings. To say that the question of reasonableness in contracts is more law-like because judges decide it would be
circular. On the analytic approach, the order of explanation must run
the other way: one must appeal to essential differences between legal
and factual questions to explain why judges should decide the issue.
Unfortunately, there is no generally agreed upon theory of mixed questions in the academic literature or elsewhere. Courts have reasonably
responded by describing mixed questions as "elusive abominations" 0 1
and the overall jurisprudence in this area as "lack[ing] clarity and
coherence." 0 2
C.

Changes in Classification Over Time

Another challenge for theorists is to explain why normative questions of fact can become legal over time, and vice versa. The Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence provides several examples of
such transitions. In certain cases, the Court will legitimize de novo
review (the standard for questions of law) of issues historically treated
as factual and reviewed deferentially. For instance, in the context of
defamation actions, whether a false statement was made with "actual
malice" or "reckless disregard of truth or falsity" was traditionally a
question of fact reviewed deferentially. 0 3 In New York Times v. Sullivan,
the Court made a finding of actual malice a condition on punitive damages in defamation actions brought by public officials.104 Shortly thereafter, the Court in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union determined that, in

light of its previous holding and the important constitutional right of
free speech that turns on it, the malice question was intermediate
between law and fact-a "constitutional fact," and, accordingly, should
be reviewed de novo by appellate courts.105
Similar examples of de novo review of what used to be paradigmatic factual findings abound in other areas of First Amendment law.
The normative question of whether speech appeals to "prurient interest" or is "patently offensive," a finding that precludes protection under
the First Amendment, is reviewed de novo.1 06 Prior to the Supreme
101. S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States., 433 F.2d 1373, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1970),
rev'd, 406 U.S. 1 (1972).
102. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated 1y
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
103. Oakes, supra note 6, at 688-98 (observing a long history ofjury findings on the
question of malice in civil and criminal defamation cases).

104.
105.

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964).
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 508-10 n.27 (1984).

In recent years, the Court has emphasized that actual malice requires "material" falsity.

Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 861 (2014).
106. SeeJenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1974) (reviewing de novo and
reversing a unanimous jury determination that the movie Carnal Knowledge was patently
offensive while recognizing that the determination was factual); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 25 (1973) ("[T]he First Amendment values ...
are adequately protected by the
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Court's seminal cases on obscenity and free speech in the 1970s, jury
findings of obscenity were deferentially reviewed as paradigmatic findings of fact for decades by appellate courts at the state and federal level,
10 7
and the Court had explicitly declined to review findings de novo.
Similarly, whether "fighting words" are "inherently inflammatory," a
finding that determines whether or not the speech is entitled to constitutional protection, is reviewed de novo as a "constitutional fact" intermediate between law and fact. 0 8 Outside the free speech context, the
Court has been far more reluctant to invoke the constitutional fact
rationale, even where normative findings, classified as factual, trigger
important constitutional rights. The Court declined to require that
questions of discriminatory intent in racial discrimination cases be
109
reviewed de novo as questions of law.
To put the issue in terms of the law/fact distinction, what is
needed is some account of why certain normative findings have come to
be treated as mixed questions of fact and law whereas others haven't.
As several commentators have pointed out, mere appeal to the imporultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional
claims when necessary"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497 (1957) (suggesting that
whether an attacked expression is suppressible is a problem requiring "particularized
judgments which appellate courts must make for themselves") (Harlan, J., concurring in
the result, dissenting in part). There is some controversy as to which part of the "prurience" determination calls for de novo review. Under Miller, prurience turns on what is
ordinarily found to be prurient, whether the work "offensively" depicts sexual conduct
specifically defined in statutory law, and whether the work lacks serious value. See United

States v. Various Articles of Merch., 230 F.3d 649, 653 (3d Cir. 2000).
107. Alexander v. United States, 271 F.2d 140, 146 (8th Cir. 1959) ("The primary
responsibility for determining the obscenity issue is upon the jury . . . . The jurors are
entitled to make their own evaluation of the books upon the basis of all the evidence

before them . . . ."); United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 354 U.S.
476 (1957) (finding that a reasonable jury could find materials obscene); Commonwealth

v. Isenstadt, 62 N.E.2d 840, 847 (Mass. 1945) ("The principal question in the case is
whether . . . we can say as matter of law that an honest jury . . . would not be acting as
reasonable men in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that this book, taken as a
whole, possesses the qualities of obscenity, indecency, or impurity. The test is not what we
ourselves think of the book, but what in our best judgment a trier of the facts might think
of it without going beyond the bounds of honesty and reason."); id. (finding that a reasonable jury could find the publication obscene). Justice Harlan, in his partial dissent in
Roth, objected to the Court's failure to review the obscenity question de novo: "I do not
understand how the Court can resolve the constitutional problems now before it without
making its own independent judgment upon the character of the material upon which
these convictions were based." Roth, 354 U.S. at 497-98 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
result, and dissenting in part). See also Whitney Strub, Slouching Towards Roth: Obscenity

and the Supreme Court, 1945-1957, 38J. Sur. CT. HIsT. 121 (2013) (noting that prior to Roth
the Court had last substantively weighed on the obscenity issue in 1896).

108.

Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (exercising independent judg-

ment on the question).

109.

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286-88 (1982) ("[W]hether the

defendants had intentionally maintained a racially segregated school system at a specified
time in the past . . . [is] essentially factual, subject to the clearly-erroneous rule."); id. at
287-88 ("That question, as we see it, is a pure question of fact."); Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613, 622-23 (1982) (applying "clearly erroneous standard" to review issue of discrimination in election rules). But see Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (reviewing de
novo racial discrimination in the exclusion ofjurors from statejuries). On discrimination
being a moral category, see BENJAMIN EIDELSON, DiSCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECr (2016).
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tance of implicated constitutional values cannot explain disparities in
the way the doctrine has been applied. 110 Moreover, what is needed is
an account of why so-called constitutional facts were previously
regarded as wholly factual, receiving deferential review, if they were
"constitutional" all along. To quote Allen and Pardo, "[w]e suppose it
is possible to confuse lions with zebras, even when staring at them for a
couple of centuries, but it is unlikely."'
The theorist can try to
explain these changes in terms of mistake or error, but crucially, an
account is needed for why judges might have been mistaken and why
confusing certain mixed or law-like factual questions for pure questions
of fact is not like confusing lions for zebras.
Additionally, there are cases of judge-decided legal issues that
come, over time, to be treated as questions of fact for the jury. To take
a relatively recent example, consider the increased role of the jury in
finding facts that bear on criminal sentencing outside of statutory
requirements/guidelines. Judges previously had discretion to raise or
lower a defendant's sentence based on factors that militate in favor of a
harsher sentence. In Apprendi, the Court prohibited judges from
enhancing criminal sentences beyond statutory maxima based on facts
other than those decided by the jury under the Sixth Amendment jury
trial right." 2 The rule was further extended to the capital sentencing
context in Ring, where the Court held that judicial determination of a
capital defendant's "death eligibility" based on "aggravating factors" was
inconsistent with Apprendi."i3 The majority emphasized that the Sixth
Amendment is not a limitation on judicial power but a reservation of
jury power. It limits judicial power only to the extent that it infringes
on the fact-finding responsibility of the jury. Determining sentencing
factors often involves normative assessment. Whether a murder was
"Cold, Calculated, and Premeditated" or "Heinous, Atrocious, and
Cruel" turns not just on empirical facts, like the use of a weapon or
injuries to bystanders, but on an assessment of the degree to which such
facts bear on the heinousness of the crime and, ultimately, militate in
favor of a harsher sentence.'"4
Prior to Ring and Apprendi, there was far greater judicial involvement in determining the existence of factors that determine appropriate punishment.1" 5 In Ring, Justice Ginsburg identified five states in
which capital sentencing, including evaluation of aggravating and miti110.

See, e.g., Allen & Pardo, supra note 9, at 1786; Monaghan, supra note 58, at

266-67.
111.

Allen & Pardo, supra note 9, at 1784.

112.
113.

Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) ("The right to trial by jury guaran-

teed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the
factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death.")

114.
115.

See id. at 592 n.1.
See Morris B. Hoffman, The Casefor jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 963-68

(2003); Kirgis, sufnra note 67, at 897-88 (noting that judges routinely made determinations after the defendant's guilt for a crime had been established to determine an appropriate sentence).
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gating factors, was entirely the responsibility of judges.' 16 Since the
Court's decisions constitutionally mandating jury determination of sentencing factors, the role of the jury has grown. In almost all states, the
jury's decision to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment is final and
cannot be overridden by a trial judge.11 7 Only Alabama affords judges
the power to override the jury and independently decide the deathdeservingness question." 8 The constitutionality of the practice is suspect, an issue we shall return to later. The crucial point for present
purposes is that the law has trended in the direction of limiting the
judge's role in determining aggravating factors that affect criminal sentencing. Increasingly, any normative finding that bears on a defendant's sentence has come to be viewed as factual rather than legal, even
though courts used to assign such findings to the judge.
D.

Skepticism About the Distinction's Overall Coherence

The aspects of law/fact jurisprudence we have considered mainly
concern the challenge that normative questions pose for courts grappling with the distinction. But, as Randall Warner points out, courts
9
In res
have struggled not just with evaluative or normative questions.]
a
with
of
action
a
cause
of
identity
the
example,
for
disputes,
judicata
previously litigated one was historically a question of fact, but came be
to be viewed in the mid-18th century as a question of law, seemingly
20
This "chawithout acknowledgement by judges of the inconsistency.'
that the
to
conclude
the
distinction
of
critics
leads
landscape"
otic legal
law/fact distinction is a "legal fiction," that "the quest to find 'the'
essential difference between [law and fact] .

.

. that can control subse-

quent classifications of questions as legal or factual is doomed from the
start, as there is no essential difference."'21
The aim, in what follows, is to demonstrate that the case law is not
as unprincipled as it seems. As far as the treatment of normative questions is concerned, there is a logic implicit in the holdings that is very
much connected to the essential difference between legal and non-legal
Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 n.6.
See discussion infra Part IV. See generally Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different
jurisprudence and the Role of the CapitalJury, 2 Omi1o ST. J. CRiM. L. 117 (2004); Bryan A.
Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role of the Jury in
Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091 (2003).
118. See discussion infra Part IV.
119. See Warner, supra note 54. See alsoRebecca Haw Allensworth, Law and the Art of
Modeling: Are Models Facts?, 103 GEO. L.J. 825 (2015) (arguing that scientific predications
based on empirical models should not be treated as findings of fact); Steven J. Madrid,
Note, Annexation of thejury's Role in Res ludicataDisputes: The Silent Migrationfrom Question of
Fact to Question of Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 465 (2013) (arguing that the law/fact
distinction has been misapplied in res judicata cases); John 0. McGinnis & Charles W.
Mulaney, judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONsT. COMMENr. 69 (2009) (arguing that courts
should treat congressionally determined "social facts" as special and review the findings
de novo); Rebecca Sharpless, Fitting the FormulaforJudicialReview: The Law-Fact Distinction
in Immigration Law, 5 INTERCULTURAL Hum. RTs. L. REv. 57, 60 (2010) (arguing that courts
have misapplied the distinction).
120. See Madrid, supra note 119.
121. Allen & Pardo, supra note 9, at 1770. See also sources cited supra note 9.

116.

117.
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questions. There are several reasons for the present focus on normative
questions, in particular-questions that invoke concepts like reasonableness, fairness, aggravation, and the like. First, the ultimate goal of
this paper is not to fully characterize the boundaries of legality and factuality.1 22 The goal is to provide a richer understanding of how the
distinction has been and should be applied by judges in a range of hard
cases that have been the focus of much recent discussion. Second, the
proper treatment of normative questions under the distinction is an
issue of unique importance to recent constitutional controversies, many
of which turn on whether the jury or judge should be deciding a question of fairness or reasonableness. The analysis bears on the proper
resolution of these controversies. 12 3 I am certain that, ultimately, more
will need to be said to defend the theory put forward and its fit with
decisions made under the rule. Moreover, an account will still need to
be given of how non-normative or empiricalquestions fit under the rule,
a question I have ignored altogether.1 24 But in showing (i) that the
skeptical case against the analytic distinction is considerably weaker
than has often been assumed and (ii) that the distinction remains doctrinally relevant, the discussion to follow should be of significant interest to both critics and proponents of the judicial practice of
distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact.
II.

A

FRAMEWORK FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF NORMATIVE QUESTIONS
UNDER THE LAW/FACT DISTINCTION

This section's aim is chiefly theoretical: to distinguish essentially
convention-dependent from convention-independent norms. Having
defended the normative distinction, I offer the beginnings of an argument for construing the categories of law and fact in terms of it. There
are both conceptual and pragmatic reasons for treating conventiondependent normative questions as questions of law and conventionindependent ones as questions of fact. Later sections will explore
whether and to what extent the theory helps us explain actual judicial
practice.
A.

Convention-dependent & Convention-independent Normative Questions

While all normative truths depend (or hold in virtue of) non-normative or empirical facts, normative truths can be distinguished based
122. In general, vindicating the usefulness of a concept and showing how it applies
in hard cases does not require fully characterizing necessary and sufficient conditions for
its application.
123. See discussion injra Part IV.
124. It makes sense to theorize in this piece-meal fashion about the law/fact distinction because the distinction between normative and empirical facts is a robust one. I see
no pre-theoretic reason for assuming that how the law/fact distinction is applied in the
normative context must also explain how it is applied in the empirical domain. No doubt
I am influenced in thisjudgment by my own meta-normative views. But I believe it to be a
plausible assumption common to many contemporary views on the metaphysics of the
normative domain, that the normative is distinct from the empirical.
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on the kinds of non-normative facts on which they depend.' 2 5 For
instance, there are normative truths that are hard to discern because
they depend on a wide range of complex empirical facts. 126 Whether it
is good for a market economy to encourage highly self-interested and
even exploitative economic behavior depends on a host of non-normative empirical facts pertaining to the consequences of such behavior for
the overall economy, standards of living, disparities in income, the gravity of the harms to individuals who are exploited, etc. By contrast, there
are normative truths that depend on relatively simpler or more accessible empirical facts. The wrongness of torturing someone for the sheer
fun of it follows directly from the nature of pain or those features of a
person in virtue of which they have moral status. For instance, under a
Kantian conception of morality, the prohibition on torturing persons is
made true by the dignity that persons have simply by virtue of their
capacity for free and rational agency.' 2 7 Our ordinary sense of what
125. The framework relies critically on a general truth about the normative
domain: namely that normative facts supervene on (or are made true by) other, non-normative facts. See Jaegwon Kim, Concepts of Supervenience, 45 PIIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RES. 153 (1984). Normative supervenience is taken as an uncontroversial starting point in
meta-ethics. See Gideon Rosen, What is Normative Necessity 1 (2014) (manuscript) (describing it as the "least controversial thesis in metaethics"); Michael Smith, Does the Evaluative
Supervene on the Natural?, in ETHICS AND THE A PRIOI 208 (2004) ("The supervenience of
the evaluative on the natural thus purports to operate as a conceptual constraint on evaluative judgment. This too is accepted by nearly everyone writing about the nature of

value.").
126.

On the nature of objectivity or truth in the normative domain, there is consid-

erable disagreement within moral philosophy. See T.M. SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC ABOUT
REASONS 1-15 (2014); Michael Smith, Meta-ethics, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY (Michael Smith & Frank Jackson eds., 2005). A principal source of
disagreement is whether moral or normative judgments represent facts in the way that
ordinary, descriptive judgments do. According to non-cognitivists, moral judgments
express desire-like mental states-e.g., the judgment that it is good to promote happiness
in the world merely expresses the judging agent's desire to promote happiness in the
world. The function of moral language is to express the relevant "non-cognitive" mental
states. Non-cognitivists earn our right to talk about facts in the normative or evaluative
domain by combining a desire-based view of moral judgment with a deflationary account
of truth and factuality, where the judgment "it isa fact that promoting happiness is morally good" simply amounts to judging that it is good to promote happiness. In other
words, by using the fact-based language we express the very desire-like attitude that constitutes moral judgment. See, e.g., SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A TI-IEORY OF PRACTCAL REASONING (1998). Cognitivists oppose this sort of view and very much take moral
thought and talk to involve belief-like, representational states, such as the belief that Yale
University is in New Haven, Connecticut. On one version of cognitivism ("moral nonnaturalism"), moral thought and talk describes a part of reality consisting of properties
and relations neglected by the natural sciences (irreducibly moral properties and
relations).
As in the case of legal philosophy, we can mostly ignore such disagreements, for the
only sense in which normative facts need to be objective, for our purposes, is in the sense
of being fixed by factors other than judicial preference. All talk of normative/moral
truth and fact in this article is meant to be neutral between cognitivist and non-cognitivist
theories. Non-cognitivism provides all the resources to sustain the distinctions within the
normative domain that will be discussed in what follows.
127. See, e.g., David Sussman, What's Wrong with Torture?, 33 P-IlL. & Pun. Ave. 1
(2005); see also IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 429-30

(1785); Onora O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, 14 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 252 (1985). For
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people are owed as a matter of right is presumably informed by our
sensitivity to such basic features of persons and their mental states, features we recognize as morally relevant as a matter of course.
Some normative truths hold partly in virtue of law-related conventions like legislative enactments and judicial practice. To take a prosaic
example, consider the reasons we have to drive on the right side of the
road. The normative truth that one ought to drive on the right is at
least partly determined (or made true) by the fact that we have settled
on a convention of driving on the right. Of course, following the convention has various benefits including, first and foremost, motorist
safety, and securing those benefits is one reason we follow the convention. But, nevertheless, the existence of the convention plays an essential role in making it true that one has reason to drive on the right. By
contrast, the wrongness of torture does not seem to turn on conventions we have established. It follows directly from truths about the
nature of persons from which flow basic moral rights.
Surprisingly, theoretical work on the general distinction between
convention-dependent and convention-independent normativity is limited.1 2 8 George Mavrodes' work in just war theory offers a helpful
examination of convention-dependent norms, in particular. 2 9
Mavrodes argues that various ethical principles prescribing appropriate
conduct in war that are assumed to be convention-independent are, in
fact, more plausibly regarded as convention-dependent. His main
example is the prohibition against harming enemy non-combatants,
widely thought to be a norm whose reason-giving force stems directly
from a priori facts about human dignity. Against the dignitarian view,
Mavrodes argues that sometimes non-combatants are more responsible
for the harms perpetrated by a state that justified going to war in the
first place, making them apt targets of blame and punishment.1 3 0
Moreover, if war is always unjust, then it is far from clear that immunizing non-combatants from harm is the best way of minimizing the injustices of war. He suggests, ultimately, that the reasons to follow the
principle-to the extent that it represents a genuine normative constraint on our conduct in war-may be wholly explained by the fact that
there is a reasonably widespread convention in the international comdata on the sizable percentage of Americans who believe that torture is never or rarely
everjustified, see Symposium, US. Public Opinion on Torture, 2001-2009, 43 POL. Sci. 437
(2010).
128. What is often discussed is the way specific normative obligations presuppose
practices or conventions. For example, there is an extensive literature on the nature of
promissory obligation and the general practices of promisors & promisees. SeeT.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OwE TO EACI OTHER, 295-327 (1998); Niko Kolodny & R. Jay Wallace, Promises and Practices Revisited, 31 PIL. & Pun. AFF. 119 (2003); Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REv. 481, 481-524
(2008). See also ARTHUR ISAl APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES
IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999) (arguing that agents, by entering professions like

law, can acquire unique moral license to violate familiar moral prohibitions). For helpful
discussion on this point, thanks to Stephen Galoob.
129. George I. Mavrodes, Conventions and the Morality of War, 4 PHIL. & Pun. AvF. 117
(1975).
130. Id. at 120-23.
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munity of not harming non-combatants, a convention that we have reason to support because it has made war considerably less bad in various
13 1
ways and its existence is better than having no such convention.
More generally, there can be reasons to comply with and support conventional practices that are, all things considered, less than morally
ideal (in the sense that strictly following them does not always or even
most often realize the morally best outcome) when having a widely-followed convention that does reasonably well at solving large scale moral
32
problems is better than having none at all.'
The other important study of convention-based normativity is Mark
133
Greenberg's work is
Greenberg's recent work in legal philosophy.
less concerned with the contrast between convention-dependent and
convention-independent normative truths, and more with identifying
the circumstances that give rise to convention-dependent normative
truths. Greenberg points out that legal institutions and practices can
help constitute the moral obligations and duties we have. On his "antipositivist" theory, the law just is the subset of our moral obligations that
34
But we can separate Greendepend on law-related social practices.'
berg's theory of law from his helpful commentary on the relationship
between law-related conventions and a certain class of normative truths.
Greenberg provides several examples of cases where conventions
bear on what one ought to do. Like Mavrodes, he points to circumstances that generate complex moral problems whose solution requires
collective action.' 35 In such circumstances, when some collective activity emerges that does reasonably well at achieving morally good outcomes, there can be reasons to support the practice. Greenberg's
principal example of this phenomenon is "specific schemes for the pub13 6
lic good," like tax laws:
Without a legal system, people will have general moral obligations
to help others. But there will often be no moral obligation to give
any particular amount of money to any particular scheme. For
one thing, especially when it comes to problems of any complexity, many different possible schemes are likely to be beneficial,
and the efforts of many people are needed for a scheme to make a
1 37
difference.
The tax system solves this problem, more or less effectively, by selecting
one scheme directed at the public good. Once we have tax laws in
place, our general moral obligation to help others becomes a more specific one so long as paying taxes represents an especially effective way of
discharging the general duty to help others. Moreover, the reasons to
support and participate in a scheme are especially strong when it is part
of a broader social institution that we have reason to respect (e.g., a
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 124-30.
Id. at 127.
See Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 Yale L.J. 1288 (2014).

134.
135.

Id. On anti-positivism, see discussion infra note 149.
Greenberg, supra note 133, at 1312.

136.
137.

Id. at 1314.
Id.
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democratic system). Greenberg describes such reasons for respecting
social conventions as "reasons of democracy."' 3 8
Another way that conventions can end up influencing what one
ought to do is through the logic of promising:
By making promises and entering into agreements, people change
their moral obligations. The fact of agreement has moral force.
Even if what was agreed on is an arrangement that is seriously
morally flawed-a different arrangement would have been much
fairer, for example-the fact that the arrangement was agreed on
may be sufficient to create a moral obligation.' 3 9
In this way, the existence of a convention, and one's explicit or implicit
acceptance of it, can generate reasons for acting in accordance with the
convention, reasons of a similar species as those that favor keeping
one's promises having to do with respecting the expectations of
others.1 40 Market conventions plausibly have this kind of normative
force for economic agents.
Now, consider convention-independence. It seems unlikely that the
establishment of new conventions could explain or alter the significance of our most basic moral norms. Consider the question of
whether a person morally deserves to be executed for his crime. It
seems unlikely that an affirmative answer to this question turns in any
way on how we have historically sentenced capital defendants. Even if
there were a convention in place of executing a particular class of
defendants, this would not make it morally appropriate to visit such a
grave harm on a person who did not independently deserve it. The
appropriateness of ending someone's life, as a threshold matter, does
not seem to turn on what we do or have done "around here." It turns, if
anything does, on fundamental facts regarding what persons deserve in
light of their actions and circumstances. 4 1
The notion that there are norms that are relatively "inflexible" and
derive their force not from what we say or do around here but from a
priori facts about persons and the nature of certain harms is a familiar
one.1 4 2 Facts concerning fundamental rights of the sort emphasized by
138. Id. at 1313.
139. Id. at 1312-13.
140. See also sources cited supra note 128.
141. The point is routinely emphasized in the case law. See sources cited supra note
72. Prominent theories of criminal law's justification declare proportionality to be an
essential moral precondition on just punishment, and the principle finds approval in prevailing practice. See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 9 (1968); Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment:

"Proportionality"Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REv. 571, 646 (2005) ("Limiting retributivism is a sound jurisprudential principle which enjoys widespread support, and the
Supreme Court has used this principle to place constitutional limits on the imposition of
capital punishment, fines and forfeitures, and punitive damages.").
142.

On the grounds of moral status and basic rights, see JEREMY BENTHAM, AN

INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789); ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); WARREN QUINN, MORALITY AND ACTION (1993); Joel

Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VmA..ui INQUIRY 243 (1970).
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deontologists fall within this normative category. Here, for example, is
Frances Kamm on the grounds of the right to free speech:
The right to speak may simply be the only appropriate way to treat
people with minds of their own and the capacity to use means to express

it .... To say that any given person is not entitled to the strong
right to free speech is ... a way of saying that certain crucialfeatures
143
of human nature are not sufficient to generate the right in anyone.

As a rule of thumb, relatively fundamental moral truths concerning
rights and basic obligations tend to be convention-independent. They
tend to be convention-independent because they express truths about
14 4
Even a
what persons are owed simply on account of being persons.
and
to
balancing
subject
are
consequentialist who thinks that all rights
compromise can get behind the notion that some are especially weighty
and basic in that their significance stems from fundamental facts about
human experience.1 45
It might be helpful in what follows to refer to conventions displacing or altering pre-conventional moral norms, where this denotes the
process by which the establishment of conventions generates reasons
for following the convention as opposed to whatever pre-conventional
moral rule that would have been authoritative absent the convention.
Whereas conventions cannot displace or alter some basic moral principles and prohibitions, conventional establishment can shape, in combination with the fundamental moral truths, what ought to be done in
circumstances where many competing values are at stake that are
roughly on a par and trade-offs are inevitable. When we do not have
simple deontological rights and prohibitions to resolve normative questions regarding what ought to be done, the role of conventions and
reasons for following them tend to acquire greater significance.
In sum, there is a genuine and structurally interesting difference
between convention-dependent and convention-independent normative facts. The former, like the obligation to pay taxes, partly depend
on conventional facts, including sometimes the very social practices and
conventions that are law-related (in that they are influenced by the
actions of paradigmatic legal actors like judges and legislators). Essentially convention-dependent norms tend to be ones that wouldn't arise
but for the establishment of conventions. These often (1) concern the
distribution of those benefits and burdens that do not implicate matters
of fundamental right; (2) solve moral problems that require large-scale
collective action; and (3) arise in contexts where a paramount concern
is respecting the expectations of participants in a convention. Normative questions that do not turn primarily on conventions (law-related or
otherwise) tend to implicate matters of fundamental right and wrong.
143. INTRICATE ETHICS 247 (2007) (emphasis added).
144. Crucially, it is not simply their moral status that determines their pre-conventionality. Recall Greenberg's example of the way tax schemes alter our general moral
duty to help others. Instead, it is the subject matter and relative importance of the relevant moral truths that makes them pre-conventional.
145. See James Dreier, Structures of Normative Theories, 76 TIHE MONIST 22 (1993);
Philip Pettit, The Consequentialist Can Recognise Rights, 38 PHIL. Q. 42 (1988).
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Our answers to these reflect our pre-conventional sense of what we owe
to each other.
Just as we can ask of a highly specific (or "token") normative question (e.g., did Susan, in light of all the empirical facts true in her case,
behave unreasonably?), whether it is convention-dependent or -independent, we can ask of normative questions considered in general-or
types of normative questions-how likely they are to be essentially convention-dependent or -independent in individual cases (e.g., questions
concerning reasonable risk-taking). In other words, we can ask how
likely a type of question is to be settled by a basic moral principle of
right and wrong. Bear in mind that judges apply the law/fact distinction to types of questions (like questions of reasonableness in torts), not
to highly particular questions in an ad hoc, case-specific way. So, the
general question of likelihood is important for purposes of applying the
law/fact distinction. The likelihood that a given type of question will be
convention-independent may in many cases be hard to determine. 4 6
But the potential for complexity should be no mark against the genuineness of the distinction between convention-dependent and convention-independent normativity.
B.

The Conceptual and PragmaticReasons for Interpreting "Law" and
"Fact"in Terms of the Normative Distinction

There are conceptual as well as pragmatic reasons for classifying
normative questions that are more likely to be essentially conventiondependent as legal and those likely to be convention-independent as
factual. Beginning with the conceptual reasons, despite considerable
disagreement in legal philosophy, there is relative consensus that law is
distinguished at least in part by its unique dependence on certain sorts
of social practices and conventions.1 47 Legal facts paradigmatically (if
146. For instance, Mavrodes may be wrong about our reasons for obeying standard
prohibitions against harming enemy non-combatants in war, and it turns out that our
reasons predominantly hinge on fundamental facts about human dignity. Conventionbased reasons may nevertheless form an important component of the totality of considerations in favor of complying with such a prohibition. See, e.g., Robert K. Fullinwider, War
and Innocence, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 90 (arguing that the prohibitions against harming noncombatants is not wholly convention-based). This issue will be taken up in a discussion of
"mixed" questions of law and fact.
147. Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, 10 LEGAL. THEORY 157, 157 (2004)
("Nearly all philosophers of law agree that ... ordinary empirical facts about the behavior
and mental states of people such as legislators, judges, other government officials, and
voters play a part in determining [law].").
The central task of analytic jurisprudence is to describe in the most fundamental
terms what law is: the features in virtue of which a norm gets to be legal rather than
something else. The hope is that work in this area of legal philosophy might help us
distinguish "law" from "fact." Legal philosophers have had little to say about the law/fact
distinction. This is somewhat surprising given that the common law rule provides a convenient test-case for philosophical theories of law. See Jol-IN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832); RONALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986); HART, supra

note 141. For criticism of the notion that the legal concept has a distinctive essence, see
Brian Leiter, The DemarcationProblem in jurisprudence:A New Casefor Scepticism, 31 OxrORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 663 (2011).
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not always) depend on what individuals such as legislatures, judges, and
elected officials, say, believe, do, or intend. I refer to the relevant law4 8
To illusdetermining activities of persons as law-related conventions.'
murderfirst-degree
that
jurisdiction
trate the point, if it is the law in a
ers are imprisoned for life, this fact holds at least partly in virtue of such
social practices and conventions as legislators having enacted, according to established procedures, a statute that prescribes life-imprisonment for murderers.
This essential connection between law and social conventions may
not be the whole story regarding how legal facts are determined.
Indeed, analytic jurisprudence has been embroiled in a famous disagreement over the remainder."') But it suffices for present purposes to
find some characteristic feature of law that might be useful in contrasting legal from non-legal questions-namely, the dependence of legal
questions on various social practices and conventions.
Convention-dependent normative questions are accordingly lawlike. They essentially depend on conventions, law-related or otherwise:
the practices of merchants, regulators, parties to a case, judges, and so
on. As in the case of paradigmatic legal questions, figuring out convention-dependent normative facts often requires looking to practices
within legal institutions and what legal actors have done and intended
to do (recall the example of market norms). This fact furnishes a
sound conceptual reason to treat convention-dependent normative
questions as questions of law.
The conceptual reason is buttressed by pragmatic considerations.
It is often suggested that the law/fact distinction is primarily a device
for allocating decision-making responsibilities between judge and jury
based on their respective competencies. Judges are thought to be better suited than juries to decide questions of law but not questions of
fact. The convention-dependence of law (in general) furnishes a
straightforward general justification for the rule: it makes eminent
148. This is only slightly artificial usage, considering that "conventions" in the ordinary sense refers to things said and done as a matter of course (or customary human
activity). If my usage of "convention" feels unnatural, the reader should feel free to substitute all instances of "convention" with "what people say and do." The distinction
between normative questions that depend on "what people say or do" and those that are
independent can do all the theoretical work that is required. See discussion infra Part II.B.
149. The disagreement that has come to define the field is whether distinctly moral
(or broadly normative) facts in addition to the social practice facts necessarily contribute
to making the law what it is. Positivists believe that it is only social practice facts that are
essential to law. Hart, for instance, famously thought that a rule's being law was wholly
determined by the rule's being part of a broader hierarchy of rules habitually obeyed in
the community, including "primary rules" that prescribe what individuals should do in
various situations, and "secondary rules," which specify the circumstances under which a
primary rule emerges. Hart, supra note 141, at 99. By contrast, anti-positivists think that
moral facts, like the fact that it is morally good for a community to abide by the plain
meaning of statutes, help determine the legal rules of ajurisdiction, along with the relevant social practices. See Dworkin, supra note 147, at 52, 87. The dispute between positivists and anti-positivists goes well beyond the Hart-Dworkin debate, and the battle lines
continue to be drawn, in new and interesting ways, by contemporary positivists and antipositivists.

See, e.g., Scorr SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011); Greenberg, supra note 133.
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sense for judges rather than the jury to decide questions of law if
answering these questions requires figuring out such conventions as
what judges and legislatures have decided and done, given that judges
are trained and have expertise in interpreting judicial and legislative
behavior. This justification extends to judges deciding essentially convention-dependent normative questions, even when the conventions
aren't law-related, insofar as the skill that judges acquire at interpreting
social practices is suitably general.
Secondly, conventions serve their coordinating function best when
they are more widely known and well understood. Judges unlike jurors
articulate reasons for their conclusions and this makes them especially
well-situated to promulgate conventions in the course of deciding
essentially convention-dependent normative questions. By contrast,
even in cases of special verdicts, the jury gives little to no explanation
for its ultimate rulings on issues. The jury's inability to give detailed
accounts of its judgments makes it less suited to articulate the facts concerning social conventions underlying its normative conclusions.
Accordingly, judges are well-suited to decide convention-dependent
normative questions.
Thirdly, as discussed earlier, there is often no determinate answer
to convention-dependent normative questions when the conventions
are ambiguous or inconclusive. If no social practices clearly indicate
how widgets have been priced (perhaps because widgets are a recent
innovation or because merchant practices are ambiguous), there is no
determinately reasonable price within a broad range of prices. Judges
(and indeed the law) have an important role to play in "settling" indeterminate convention-dependent normative questions, by simply choosing a convention-or, in other words, by convention-mongering in such
cases. As quasi-legislative actors, judges have authority to make such
choices.
By contrast, conceptual and pragmatic reasons militate against
judges deciding convention-independent normative questions. It is
much harder to justify the claim that judges might be better suited than
juries to decide questions concerning matters of fundamental moral
right-for instance, those concerning what persons are owed simply on
account of being persons. Furthermore, in a pluralistic society characterized by significant moral disagreement on questions of fundamental
right, it seems appropriate to have the jury (rather than a single judge)
decide convention-independent moral questions if and when they come
up at trial insofar as the jury consists of multiple persons drawn from a
representative cross-section of the community. We no doubt tolerate
deviations from this principle, as in the case ofjudicial interpretation of
basic rights enshrined in the Constitution. But in such cases judges
have explicit constitutional or legislative authority to decide the basic
moral question. When a question of basic morality arises at trial and
the Constitution and plain statutory law are silent as to who decides the
question-which is precisely when the common law rule applies-it
seems intuitive to think that judges lack default authority to decide the
question. At the very least, in such cases judicial authority to decide the
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question does not seem like it can be grounded in the question's
nature.1 50 So, in general, it seems a sound rule for a legal system to
adopt that questions of basic moral right and wrong that come up at
trial and that haven't been explicitly assigned to judge or jury by the
legislature or the Constitution are presumptively questions of fact for
the jury.
With the meta-normative distinction in place and reasons for thinking that judges should be tracking it in allocating decision-making
responsibilities between judge and jury, the next step is to see whether
judges really have been tracking this distinction given their treatment of
normative questions under the law/fact rule. I take up this challenge in
the next section.
III.

JUDICIAL SENSITIVITY TO CONVENTIONAL AND
PRE-CONVENTIONAL NoRms

The preceding section suggests a rationale for distinguishing nor-

mative questions under the law/fact distinction. Some normative questions are essentially convention-dependent in that addressing them
requires figuring out conventions (often law-related ones, like what

prior judges or legislators have done, for example) or settling on new
conventions.

This makes them importantly "law-like" on standard

accounts of the nature of law, and judges happen to be uniquely suited
to resolving them. There are also normative questions that are convention-independent. These typically concern fundamental moral requirements and prohibitions (matters ofjustice or basic rights). Conventionindependent normative questions can reasonably be regarded as "ques51
The
tions of fact"-they have little if anything to do with law as such.1
aim of this section is to show that this basic principle helps explain judicial practice concerning the classification of normative questions under
the law/fact distinction.
A.

Convention-independent Norms in Negligence Law and Sentencing

The question of reasonable conduct in negligence cases and other
areas of tort law has historically been treated as factual under the common-law rule. Its status as a relatively convention-independent norma150. This argument based on judicial professional authority and legitimacy is the
crux of the normative rationale for understanding the distinction as I suggest. The common law's key insight reflected in judicial interpretation of the law/fact distinction is that
as a defaull matterjudges lack authority to decide basic questions ofjustice because these
questions are not essentially questions of law.
151. There are echoes of this reasoning in the case law. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.16 (1984) (justifying de novo review in cases
where a factual finding "clearly implies the application of standards of law" and where it
"cannot escape broadly social judgments") (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322
U.S. 665, 670-71 (1944)). The present account fills in the details regarding when evaluative questions "imply the application of standards of law." They do when conventiondependent norms are implicated.
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tive question finds support in corrective justice theories of tort law. 15 2
On the corrective justice approach, the concept of a moral wrong is
central to tort law, especially in the case of intentional torts, like assault
and battery, as well as negligence.1 53 A standard negligence claim
involves a plaintiff claiming redress for having been wronged by the
defendant's failure to exercise the degree of care of a reasonable person. The wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct is explained not in
morally neutral terms, such as the defendant's being the "least-cost
avoider" of the harms caused, but in terms that imply moral culpability
and blame.1 54 The defendant exhibited inadequateregard for the interests of others.
The relevant aspect of this tradition in tort law scholarship is not
just its emphasis on a distinctly moral concept of wrongfulness or
unreasonableness at the heart of tort law, but precisely the conviction
amongst proponents of the view that the question of reasonableness/
unreasonableness often turns on fundamental facts regarding the rights
of persons. As Gregory Keating writes, "tort norms articulate obligations to avoid harming people in various ways, and to respect their
authority over their persons and their property in various ways. These
wrongs are grounded .

.

. in rights people have as persons, such as the

right to physical and psychological integrity."' 5 5 Why does the wrongfulness of tortious conduct often turn on fundamental moral rights?
Part of the explanation concerns the nature and significance of the
interests that "reasonable care" in this context is meant to protect. The
relevant moral norms of reasonable behavior "protect important
boundaries against unauthorised [sic] crossings" and "our essential
interests as persons." 56 These interests include one's sovereignty and
power of discretion "over one's physical person or one's real prop152. See, e.g., JuLEs COLEMAN, TH-E PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL TI-IEORY (2001); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, Ti-iiE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw
(1995); Jules Coleman, Correctivejustice and Wrongfid Gain, I IJ. LEGAL STun., 420 (1982);
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEx. L. REV. 917 (2010);
Keating, supra note 30, at 367; Ernest j. Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34
McGILL L.J. 403 (1988). See generally PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw (David G.
Owen eds., 1995). Corrective justice theory is not the only approach to tort law that
emphasizes the centrality of wrong or blameworthy action in torts. Keating's approach,
for example, does away with the focus on remedial obligation. Imposing remedial obligations on tort-feasors is just a second-best way of ensuring that agents don't commit a
certain class of wrongs in the first place.
153. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 30, at 367; Coleman, supra note 152, at 9, 15, 36.
154. See, e.g., James A. Henderson Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 377 (2002) (noting that basing liability on wrongful conduct rather than on conduct
that merely causes harm appeals to the shared intuitions ofAmerican judges.). Cf GuIoo
CALABRESI, TI-IE COS-Ts OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970) ("I take it as axiomatic that the principal
function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents.").
155. Keating, supra note 30, at 369. See also id. at 383 ("The facts that tort rights and
obligations attach to persons simply as persons . . . and run from every person in the
jurisdiction to every other person, need to be front and center in our thinking about the
character and content of primary obligations."). Keating's view is wrong-based but does
not emphasize remedial or corrective obligations.

156.

Id. at 390, 393.
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erty." 1 57 Joel Feinberg in his famous catalog of harms identifies certain
interests of persons as critical including:
[T]he interests in one's own physical health and vigor, the integrity and normal functioning of one's body, the absence of absorbing pain and suffering or grotesque disfigurement, minimal
intellectual acuity, emotional stability, the absence of groundless
anxieties and resentments, the capacity to engage normally in
social intercourse and to enjoy and maintain friendships, at least
minimal income.15 8
Negligence cases routinely involve the failure of agents to guard against
setbacks to interests that fall in Feinberg's privileged set of critical interests-as when an employer's failure to implement a safety feature
results in the amputation of an employee's limbs; and when they do
not, as when the harms are purely economic and arise out of market
exchange, courts tend to be reluctant to treat the case under tort
law. 15

Another reason for thinking that the reasonableness enquiry in
torts implicates matters of basic rights, consistently with the corrective
justice framework, is that a finding of negligence liability plausibly
involves moral condemnation or blame of the defendant, and often
results in punitive damages, as in cases of gross negligence. Basic principles of fairness militate against blaming or punishing agents unless
they are truly morally blame and punishment-worthy: that is, only if
they violate their moral obligations.
The corrective justice approach can be understood in terms of the
framework developed earlier of convention-independent normativity.
The tradition emphasizes that normative questions raised in tort law are
often convention-independent; that is, they implicate "pre-conventional" moral norms. The moral norms governing reasonable risk-taking in the sort of cases that frequently recur in the tort context-cases
involving serious harms to agents-concern a form of regard we owe to
others simply on account of their being persons whose interests matter.
The relevant norms are not so easily displaced by contrary conventions
or a general practice of doing less than what is morally required. Even
if a community developed a habit of, say, driving drunk or recklessly on
the road, for instance, this would not necessarily immunize a person
from the charge of having behaved wrongfully or negligently when they
cause substantial injury to another motorist on account of their reck157. Id. at 390. See also W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 8 (5th ed. 1984) ("The common thread woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable interference with the interests of others."); NicholasJ. McBride, Rights and the Basis of
Tort Law, in RIcITS AND PRIVATE LAw 331 (Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012).
158. Feinberg, supra note 31, at 37.
159. Under the "pure economic loss" rule, the law in most states is opposed to
recovery under tort law in cases where the plaintiffs injuries are "purely economic" and
there is no personal injury or damage to tangible property. See Herbert Bernstein, Civil

Liability for Pure Economic Loss UnderAmerican Tort Law, 46 AM.J. Comp. L. 111, 112 (1998);
Gergen, supra note 73, at 414 ("The narrow protection afforded economic interests in
tort law signals the law's greater tolerance for selfishness when the interests affected are
purely economic.").
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lessness. Given the gravity of the harms at stake, it seems sensible to
assume that persons do not freely and intelligently consent to a relaxation of moral prohibitions and requirements in this domain, at least not
without careful and near universal consideration of the merits of doing
so. In other words, bad driving habits that emerge organically, even
when they generate expectations of reckless behavior on the road, cannot wholly undermine the moral obligation one has as a motorist simply to avoid being reckless. After all, people's lives are at stake. While
sufficiently wide spread and deliberately chosen conventions of
increased risk-taking-ones that have been legislatively enacted, for
instance-could theoretically displace moral norms prohibiting negligence on the road, the fact that they would have to be widely shared
and very deliberately chosen itself reflects the relative inflexibility of
basic moral norms in the negligence context.
It is certainly true that the norms of the reasonable person are also
meant to be ones that are generally obeyed in society (the norms, as it is
often put, are those internalized by the "ordinary, prudent person"). 6 0
However, it would be odd to think that it is the fact that most of us do
not behave recklessly that grounds the moral wrongfulness of driving at
high speeds or under the influence. Our practices have evidential
value, indicating as they do the existence of basic norms of decency and
reasonable behavior that most people follow as a matter of course.
More importantly, our practices in the negligence context are not decisive. They must be tested against questions of basic rights and fairness.
Undoubtedly, there are cases in tort law where the harms in question seem less severe, falling short of violations of interests on Feinberg's list. Accordingly, it becomes more plausible that the norm
violated evolved from and depends essentially on conventions. Arguably, part of what makes it morally unreasonable to fail to keep one's
house in good repair when inviting people over is that people expect
responsible community members to do the same, an expectation that
may well be grounded in a general practice of repairing one's home
rather than a priori moral facts about what invitees are owed. 16 If the
general practice disappeared, perhaps some of the moral obligation to
keep one's home in good repair would be undercut (and the onus
would be on the invitee to take reasonable precautions or else assume
the risk of harm). Conventions play an even bigger role, consistently
with the corrective justice framework, in cases where the reasonable
person standard is applied to professionals, like doctors and lawyers. In
such cases, the standard is naturally articulated by reference to the prac-

160.

See, e.g., N.Y. P.J.I. 2:10 (3d ed. 2000); Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt,

What judges Tell juies about Negligence: A Review of Patternjury Instructions, 77 C-n-KENT L.

Ri'v. 587, 595 (2002) (describing the emphasis injury instructions on "ordinary" care).
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1977) (discussing premises liability); PatrickJ. Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of Tort Liability,

38 CLEV. Sr. L. REv. 315, 324-25 (1990) (discussing the role of community safety norms
in settling expectations).
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tices and conventions amongst the relevant professional class regarding
different sorts of risks. 162
Even if conventions play some role in shaping our sense of what
counts as morally reasonable risk-taking, this hardly settles whether the
conventions determine the standard of care or instead exist precisely
because members of the community have internalized fundamental
163
Given the interests at
norms requiring adequate concern for others.
stake-in the case of risk to invitees, their interest in physical safety-it
is at least plausible that the conventions and general practice amongst
home owners reflect or operate in tandem with the background pre-conventional norms governing interpersonal interactions rather than creating or co-opting those norms.164 The view does not require being
overly sanguine about the degree to which our community standards
for risk-taking (or the standards internalized by professionals like doctors and lawyers) realize the best of all possible moral worlds; or that
the ordinary person shows just the kind of care that we, independently
of our conventions, morally owe to one another. The view depends
only on its being plausible that our general conventions of protecting
the critical interests of others, including their health and safety, get
things at least roughly right from the pre-conventional moral point of
view. Indeed, in many but not all cases our conventions are themselves
the result of agents trying to do what they morally ought to. Our conventions need not be morally perfect for the point to stand that their
evidential significance in the negligence context may go only so far as
they line up with an independent and relatively basic moral structure of
what we owe to each other.16 5 Moreover, it is eminently plausible that
our conventions of risk-taking need to be regularly tested against the
basic moral question of what agents are owed as a matter of right given
the harms at stake-in many cases, the fact that the defendant's actions
were consistent with what is conventionally done will not immunize her
from liability. 166 To quote Learned Hand in the famous TJHoopercase:
"there are some precautions so imperative that even their universal dis67
regard will not excuse their omission."'
162. See Joseph H. King Jr., In Search of a Standardof Care for the Medicial Profession:
The "Accepted Practice"Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213 (1975); James 0. Pearson, Annotation, Modern Status of "Locality Rule" in Malpractice Action Against Physician Who Is not a
Specialist, 99 A.L.R.3d 1133 (1980).
163. See discussion in Keating, supra note 30, at 369.
164. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 161, at 324 (noting that community safety norms
can develop through moral teaching).
165. For a related view, see Benjamin Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 Wm. & L. REv.
1999 (2007). On Zipursky's view as I understand it, in interpreting negligence standards,
jurors figure out obligations of reciprocity through their participation in (and commitment to) common conventions. The relevant obligations are not necessarily moral in
nature. Conformity to them involves a kind of non-moral virtue. The point on which
both Zipursky and I agree is that the question of what is reasonable in negligence is a
normative question, and not identical to the question of what the conventions are. Our
conventions are a means to understanding the relevant norms.
166. The discussion to follow of various cases elaborates on this point.

167.

60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). Thanks tojens Ohlin for reminding me of Hand's

discussion of the issue.
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Admittedly, the approach to negligence defended by corrective justice theorists and other theorists of tort law that focus on wrongful
action is far from universally accepted. However, it suffices for present
purposes that the view is plausible and widely-endorsed. For it is
enough to rationalize (not fully vindicate) judicial behavior using our
basic principle to motivate its explanatory potential. Corrective justice
theory has been tremendously influential historically, and continues to
be widely embraced. Its proponents include Blackstone and influential
nineteenth-century American jurists.'6 8

So long as the question of reasonableness in negligence law is plausibly understood to implicate convention-independent norms, the case
law appears driven by the claimed difference between legal and factual
normative questions. Even if the norms applicable in the negligence
context turn out to be far more convention-dependent than they
appear, this would not make the historic practice of judges assigning
the question to juries inexplicable. The structure of reasonableness
norms in the context of dangerous risk-taking is far from obvious, and it
is eminently reasonable to suppose that convention-independent moral
principles concerning basic rights should have an important role to
play in settling when injured persons should be entitled to demand
redress and punishment when others inflict dangerous risks on them.
While a full-scale defense of corrective justice theory and related
approaches to negligence law is not the point of this section, it is worth
expanding on some of the ways in which corrective justice theory can
explain key aspects of negligence law that other theories struggle with.
It will be helpful to compare the theory with its main rival amongst
theorists: the law and economics approach. 169 The economic approach
traditionally eschews moral categories in explaining tort law's normative concepts. What makes negligent conduct "unreasonable" is not
that it violates some a priori or relatively basic moral norm. Instead, its
unreasonableness is wholly explained by the fact that it inflicts a harm
on the defendant that the negligent actor could have more cheaply
avoided. Moreover, the imposition of liability is conceptualized not as
punishment for immoral conduct but as akin to a licensing fee or tax
imposed to incentivize efficient risk-taking: risk-taking that minimizes
the monetary costs of accidents.1 70 The resulting account characterizes
tort law's ultimate aim as that of efficiently allocating costs in a way that
168.

See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 152, at 928 n.67 (citing jurists for the

moral wrong based view of torts).
169. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 154; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 85-107 (1987); Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29

HARv. L. Rrv. 40 (1915); see also United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.
1947) (articulating the famous Learned Hand formula for negligence). On the Hand
formula, a person's conduct is unreasonable only if PL > B, where Pis the probability of
an injury occurring, L is the magnitude of the injury, and B is the expected benefit of
engaging in the conduct. The economic approach appraises L and B in financial terms
(often using willingness to pay as a proxy for value).
170. See, e.g, CALABRESI, supira note 154.
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leads to overall wealth maximization.1 7 1 The economic approach may
be very sensible in many domains of tort law-e.g., strict liability law
and cases where the harms at stake fall outside of Feinberg's critical
interests. But it struggles to explain the actual practice ofjuries empowered to decide the question of negligence.17 2
In a systematic examination of state jury instructions, Patrick Kelley
and Laurel Wendt find that jurors deciding the negligence issue are
never told, through jury instructions or otherwise, to calculate and
73
decide purely based on how costly it was to take relevant precautions.1
Neither are they usually told to look at general conventions except in
cases involving professional actors like doctors or lawyers. Kelley and
Wendt write:
To law professors, of course, unreasonable foreseeable risk conjures up Henry Taylor Terry's cost-benefit test for negligence,
embodied in the first and second Restatements and summarized
in Learned Hand's Carroll Towing Company test. But it seems to us

that this is not the meaning that would be conveyed to the jury [of
reasonable prudence] .

. .

. The instructions seem to call on the

jury to determine whether the defendant's conduct, which
resulted in harm to the plaintiff, was a private injustice to the

plaintiff.1 74
The hypothesized reasonable persons, "though not paragons of virtue
simpliciter, can be expected to act in reasonably careful or reasonably
prudent ways. The only virtue this fully endows the hypothesized person with is the virtue ofjustice: the reasonably careful person exercising
ordinary care under the circumstances gives the plaintiff what is her
due."1 75 While some states add various qualifications to the typical
instructions (qualifications having to do with emergency situations,
avoidable situations, and with the inappropriateness of imposing an
excessively demanding standard of an exceptionally reasonable person,
for example), none of them excuse the defendant if most people would have
done the same or if the financial costs of taking precautions would have out-

weighed the benefits.17 6 State jury instructions routinely include the disclaimer: "the law does not say how the negligence standard applies,
rather that it is for the jury to decide, based upon the facts in the
case."177 Moreover, recommendations made by scholars that normative
language be excised from instructions on negligence so that they refer
171.
promoted
172.
Schwartz,

See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 169, at 154-57 (defining values to be
in terms of willingness to pay and wealth maximization).
Some theorists favor mixed theories of tort law for this reason. See, e.g., Gary T.
Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Correctivejustice, 75 TEX.

L. REv. 1801 (1997).
173.

Kelley & Wendt, supra note 63.

174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

618-21 (emphasis added).
621.
603-07.
608 (citing Mich. 10.02 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 2001)).
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only to care taken by the "ordinary person"-rather than the ordinary,
reasonableperson-have been followed virtually nowhere.1 78
Jury instructions on negligence reveal more than just the difficulties confronting the economic theory of tort law (construed as a theory
attempting to describe how the law is rather than how it ought to be).
They reinforce the central claim made by corrective justice theoriststhat jurors deciding the negligence issue are invited to tap into their
basic moral sentiments, those "constitutive of the [ordinary] sense of
justice itself."1 79 While it is impossible to say with certainty how jurors
in fact decide what counts as reasonable or unreasonable risk-taking,
there is considerable evidence to suggest that jurors respond unfavorably to defendants who defend risk-taking by appeal to conventions or
economic cost-benefit analysis.1 80 The famous Ford Pinto case provides
but one example of juror antipathy to economic and convention-based
reasoning.' 8 ' Ford was found to have sold its Pinto model car with a
design element that made it especially prone to explosion upon impact
from the rear, a feature that Ford knew would result in deaths and serious injuries amongst customers. Ford's engineers and management
were especially explicit in their rationale for not implementing a safer
design. They found that the cost of the safer design was outweighed by
the amount Ford would have to pay in liability for deaths, pain, and
suffering caused by exploding Pintos. Ford based its calculations on
actuarial tables estimating the 'value' of a person's life. 18 2 Jurors found
Ford guilty of negligence and imposed hefty punitive damages despite
Ford's insistence that such cost-benefit calculations were routinely
made in the industry. According to the jury, Ford displayed inadequate
regard for people's lives and its decision to tolerate the risks inherent in
selling the Pinto was not one that was Ford's to unilaterally make.18 3
The Ford Pinto case is far from unusual in terms of juror behavior.1 8 4
The actual practice of jurors lends further plausibility to the claim that
the question of reasonableness in negligence law is widely seen to be
likely to be a convention-independent moral question.
Moving on to the death penalty case, there is an even stronger
argument to be made that normative questions that arise in capital sentencing (e.g., whether the defendant's conduct was sufficiently heinous
178. Id. at 613 (describing unsuccessful attempts to simplify instructions by excising
'reasonable').
179. Keating, supra note 30, at 376.
180.
See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, The Standankd of Care in Negligence Law, in Pi-itoSOPmICAL FOUNDATIONS OF Towr LAw 249, 263 (David G. Owen ed., 1997) ("Defendants
that are thought to have deliberately made such risk-utility decisions are often deemed by
juries and judges not only to have been negligent, but also to have behaved so egregiously
as to justify a hefty award of punitive damages . . . ."); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the
Economy in Nineteenth Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE LJ. 1717, 1757 (1981)
(finding that New Hampshire and California courts are reluctant to find that economic
costliness justified a defendant's risk-taking).
181. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981); see albo Gary T.
Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 1013, 1034-38 (1991).
182. Schwartz, supra note 181, at 1020.
183. Id. at 1014.
184. See sources cited, supra note 180.
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to warrant the death penalty) are convention-independent (and hence
factual). Whether and to what extent aggravating or mitigating factors
are present in the defendant's case-that is, whether the facts militate
5
for capital punishment-is almost universally decided by the jury.18
18 6
It amounts, ultiThe question is one of profound moral seriousness.
mately, to the question of whether the state is justified in taking a person's life, an affirmative answer to which depends on what we owe
convicted criminals as a matter of right.' 8 7 If criminal defendants who
have suffered from severe mental handicaps have a moral right to the
community's mercy, for example, conventions (law-related or otherwise) cannot displace their right to the community's mercy. The significance of the right depends, among other things, on the way mental
handicaps impair a person's capacities for moral and rational action,
188
Even if we
and the gravity of the harm that is ending a person's life.
have previously executed defendants who have suffered from severe
mental handicaps, our previous practices would not shake the fundamental moral prohibition-if there is one-on sentencing them to
death.
The stakes are simply too high for normative evaluation of the
aggravating or mitigating significance of the defendant's conduct and
circumstance, at least one that favors the death penalty, to turn on convention-based reasoning.18 9 The harm of undeserved execution is not
outweighed by the value of following conventions in the death penalty
context. It is no surprise, then, that the Supreme Court has explicitly
prohibited the use of legal rules for discarding potentially mitigating
evidence in juror instructions.1 90 The frequently repeated mantra in
185.

See discussion supra Part I.C.

186.

See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (noting that the death

sentences must "reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime") (emphasis in original). Members of the Court have consistently recognized that the law demands moral deliberation from the sentencer, that the life-or-death
decision is a question concerning the defendant's "moral entitlement to live," Spaziano v.

Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 469 (1984), and that it must be based on a "moral inquiry into [his]
culpability," California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 180 (2006) (noting that ajury is constitutionally tasked
to engage in a "measured, normative process ... when deciding the appropriate sentence

for a capital defendant"); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 317 (1990); Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985).
187. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment
demands more than that a challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary society. The Court also must ask whether it comports with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment.").
188. See, e.g., Richard Lipke, Social Deprivation as Tempting Fate, 5 Cium. L. PHIL. 277
(2011). The Supreme Court has essentially affirmed this style of moral reasoning as having broad appeal, and not just among ethicists. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 319; Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000).
189. Judges can, I argue, be involved in determining whether mercy is warranted.
Mercy can be warranted, even for the most heinous offenders, by appeal to social
practice.

190.

See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding that the sentencer

cannot refuse to give the defendant's turbulent family history mitigating weight based on
a legal test of criminal responsibility); id. at 113-14 ("Just as the State may not by statute
preclude the [capital] sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the
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such rulings of the importance of deciding issues on a "case-by-case"
basis reflects the Court's recognition that legalistic reasoning cannot
support a finding that the defendant deserves to die; not, at any rate,
without allowing pre-conventional moral norms concerning what the
defendant deserves in light of the facts of his case to constrain findings
of death-eligibility.1 9 1 Accordingly, the factual status of questions concerning the existence of aggravating factors in the death penalty context (and the question of death-eligibility more generally) is not just
favored by courts in most states; it is constitutionally mandated.1 92
To sum up: questions concerning the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct in negligence cases and the question of death-eligibility
in capital sentencing are convention-independent normative questions;
answers to which do not turn primarily on conventions. Negligence law
is involved in the punishment and remedy of wrongful risk-taking-the
sort of risks that endanger the critical interests of others. The wrongfulness or unreasonableness of conduct that is familiarly the subject of a
negligence action does not turn solely on what we do around here, but
plausibly on the kind of respect that is fundamentally owed to others.
The "question of fact" classification of such normative questions is precisely what our principle concerning the difference between legal and
factual normative questions would predict. In capital sentencing, fundamental moral principles against undeserved execution must be taken
into account when issuing death sentences if a capital sentencing
regime has any chance of being morally legitimate, a fact endorsed by
the Supreme Court based on its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishment. 9 3 Questions of mitigation and aggravation are therefore reasonably regarded
as convention-independent normative questions or "questions of fact":
in deciding them the jury invokes its pre-conventional sense of justice
regarding what the defendant is owed.
B.

The Convention-dependent Morality of Contract Law

Two independent lines of reasoning suggest that normative truths
implicated in contracts disputes, having to do with the unconscionability of a contract or the reasonableness of implied terms, are in general
determined essentially by conventional facts. The first is connected to
the essential role that non-legal conventions play in determining what
counts as contractual reasonableness and/or unconscionability. Courts
sentencer refuse to consider, as a mailer of law, any relevant mitigating evidence."); see also
McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015).
191. See, e.g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 317 (1990) ("[I]n the end it is
thejury that must make the difficult, individualizedjudgment as to whether the defendant
deserves the sentence of death." (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 34 (1986)));
Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 515 (1993) (noting that a reasoned moral response
requires individual assessment of personal culpability).
192. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 584 (2002).
193. See sources cited supra note 190. See aLso Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that "the sentencer . .. not be precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfaclor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense").
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routinely look to the parties' prior course of dealings and the general
practices of the merchant community when determining whether a
94
Whereas in the
price or other implied term would be reasonable.'
case of dangerous risk-avoidance, our practices and the conduct of ordinary persons plausibly reflect or operate in tandem with (rather than
constitute) pre-conventional norms of basic decency and regard, market conventions are not ultimately a function of the moral dispositions
95
"Conventional"
of merchants or reflections of basic moral rights.'
self-interest under
own
their
pursuing
prices are fixed based on parties
conditions of scarcity. Moreover, the going rates for goods sold in the
marketplace or prices historically accepted by buyers and sellers seem
to weigh significantly on the reasonableness of set prices, given that parties can expect to be charged such rates in the absence of explicit agreement.1 9 6 So long as one of the central values to be promoted through
contract law is the expectations of parties, as is often suggested, then
the relevant market-based conventional facts can truly be said to determine in a non-derivative way the reasonableness of implied terms and
97
contractual fairness.1

Given the dependence of contract law on non-legal conventions, it
is not hard to see why what counts as contractual reasonableness and
194. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-303 (2011); Western Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Canada Ltd.,
739 F.2d 1198, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) (trade custom can even override UCC gap-filler
defaults and can give rise to binding contract provisions); American Mach. & Tool Co. v.
Strite-Anderson Mfg. Co., 353 N.W.2d 592, 596-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (evidence of
trade usage and course of dealing admissible for determining delivery dates). See generally
Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Tern Contracts:An Analysis under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1 (1987); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and
ContractualConsent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992).

195. Compare the norm-determining role of conventions in contracts from their
evidential role in negligence. Plausibly, the moral norm prescribing concern for the
safety of others when driving gives rise to certain conventions on the road. These conventions then bear on the relevant standard of care. By contrast, the conventions amongst
merchants that determine what a reasonable price is for widgets are not similarly the
result of agents conforming to moral norms. The conventions play a true norm-determining role only in the latter case.
Moral norm

Convention

Standard of care

Show concern for the safety
of others when driving!

Motorists showing concern
for the safety of others

The legally relevant standard
of reasonableness

null

Merchants pricing widgets at The legally relevant standard
of reasonableness
$x
196.

See, e.g., C. A. Riley, DesigningDefault Rules in ContractLaw: Consent, Convention-

alism, and Efficiency, 20 OxFoRDJ. LEGAL STUD. 367 (2000) (arguing that gap-filling ought
to be driven by the subjective consent of the parties and the customs and conventions
immanent within the parties' community); id. at 374-82 (suggesting that the case for
conventionalist defaults include considerations having to do with cost, fairness, tacit consent, reasonable reliance, and positive incentives); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default
Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 489 (1989). It is implausible that
there are a priori moral facts regarding reasonable pricing for most non-essential goods
and services.
197.

See, e.g., Lord Steyn, Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest

Men, 113 LAw Q. REv 433 (1997); Riley, supra note 196, at 375-80.
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fairness might also depend on law-related conventions-such as judicial
practice or regulation. In many instances, the appropriate price or
some other missing term will not be settled by the prior contractual
history of the parties or even industry-wide practice; therefore, judges
must make some choice of default rule from among various acceptable
options.19 8 Judges are especially well-suited to make such choices and
the relevant default rules known, as quasi-legislative officials who can be
held accountable, given their responsibility for making the rationale
behind their judgments explicit. Any party able and empowered to
make the non-legal conventions and default rules known will inevitably
end up influencing non-legal conventions as well, given that merchants
often turn to case law for information about the merchant community's
practices. Even a court's initially mistaken interpretation of industry
custom may become correct over time because the industry conforms to
the interpretation. In other words, what judges say and decide has a role
to play in determining what counts as reasonable in contractual
exchange. It makes sense, therefore, to regard the question of reasonableness of contracts as an essentially convention-dependent normative
matter.
It is worth emphasizing why this sort of analysis does not work in
the case of negligence. Law-related conventions-legislative practice,
for instance-obviously do influence what counts as negligent conduct.
A defendant's failure to comply with statutory requirements, if it results
in harms that the statute aims to prevent, is considered negligence per
se, or negligence as a matter of law."" However, such rules drawing on
legal conventions are treated as exceptions to the general practice of
juries deciding what counts as negligent conduct. Moreover, the reason
statutory requirements are often introduced in negligence cases is
because they are plausibly derivative of more basic, pre-conventional
moral norms that parties are supposed to respect. When a person
injures another while driving drunk, what makes such conduct wrongful and unreasonable is the degree of disregard the person shows for
the safety of others. Its wrongfulness is not principally explained by the
fact that the law forbids drunk driving or the driver's failure to comply
with the law. To reiterate the point made earlier, the law-related conventions in the tort context reflect important pre-conventional moral
facts, grounded in the dignity and importance of other people and
their fundamental interests. On this popular conception of tort law,
the actor deciding the negligence issue typically does not need to know
the law-related conventions to decide whether the conduct at issue is
wrongful enough to warrant compensation and punishment.2 0 0 In
short, the way in which contractual norms are convention-dependent is
different in kind from the way legal and non-legal practices bear on the
negligence question. In the contracts case, it does not make sense for
198.

See generally, Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency and the

Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992). The U.C.C. gives courts broad gapfilling powers. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2011).
199. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PiyS. & EMOT. HARM §14 (2010).
200.

See discussion infra Part IILA, note 180.
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the decision-maker to decide what terms are reasonable independently
of conventions or by reference to their intuitive sense of what is owed to
others as a matter of basic decency. This is because the interests under
threat in contracts cases are not ones that we must, as a matter of basic
decency, safeguard out of respect for our contractual partners.
The second line of reasoning that supports the unique conventiondependence of contractual norms is more involved, and it may be better to lay out its basic structure before defending its key premises. The
main idea is that the interests of individuals safeguarded by contractual
norms (like reasonableness and unconscionability) are less morally vital
than those protected by tort and criminal law norms. Because of these
lower stakes in the economic context, pre-conventional moral norms
governing contractual exchange are comparatively easily displaced by
conventions requiring less than what pre-conventional morality
requires (always keeping one's promises, for example), especially if
such conventions can be justified by appeal to overall social good.
Moreover, such conventional displacement of ordinary morality has
plausibly occurred in the modern marketplace through a combination
of laws, economic policy, and cultural attitudes. By contrast, it is much
less plausible that fundamental moral norms prohibiting the physical
endangerment of others are flexible or have shifted in the face of contrary conventions.
Beginning with the lowered stakes, the prototypical contractual dispute over the reasonableness of implied terms or unconscionability
implicates interests of parties that are primarily economic: losing a bar20
gained-for benefit or losing more than one bargained-for. 1 As Mark
of treating
law
common
in
the
history
a
long
is
there
Gergen notes,
such economic losses arising out of voluntary transactions as having a
lesser moral significance than harms to persons and property resulting
from agents' tortious or criminal conduct. 202 There are several reasons
for this disparity. For one, the loss of an economic benefit is at best
instrumentally bad for an agent, whereas physical injury, emotional
trauma, and interference in certain privileged domains (like a person's
203
Generally, an interest
home) have an inherent or intrinsic badness.
in a particular distribution of financial benefits and burdens stemming
from voluntary trade between parties who are reasonably well off is not
a fundamental or especially urgent interest of persons. It is no doubt
true that morally important interests of persons are implicated in disputes over price terms or contractual unconscionability. But the mere
fact that morally significant interests of persons are at stake does not
201. Not all contract disputes implicate non-urgent economic interests of persons.
Whereas a dispute over what counts as a reasonable price concerns the economic interests of the contracting parties, a dispute over whether there was fraud or coercion implicates a more fundamental interest: an interest in non-domination. Appropriately,
questions of fraud and coercion are treated as questions of fact! Moreover, unconscionability is analyzed differently from coercion. For helpful discussion on this point, I thank
Scott Altman.
202. Gergen, supra note 73, at 412-13.
203. See Feinberg, supra note 31, at 31.
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entail that these interests generate rights-claims or implicate foundational moral values. The parties to such disputes do not have a claim as
a matter of right to have their interests valued over all else. These local
interests of parties to a dispute can be sacrificed more easily in the
name of conventions and general social good, than say an interest in
physical integrity.
Economic harms resulting from unconscionable contracts or contracts with unreasonable terms can certainly be substantial, as when the
losses are sustained by impoverished agents like poor tenants. If a mortgagor is about to lose her home despite having paid off a good portion
of her debt due to a uniquely burdensome mortgage, the potential
harm to her, absent judicial intervention under unconscionability doctrine, is surely great. 204 Nevertheless, it is true that the losses sustained

in the course of doing business with other self-interested economic
actors typically lack the gravity of unconsented-to physical injury or damage to real property sustained at the hands of reckless, malicious, or
negligent agents. This is a recurrent theme in the corrective justice
literature on torts as well as in accounts of the differences between contracts and other areas of law, and the supposition is borne out by
existing case law. 205

Another reason for the differential importance of harms inflicted
in paradigmatic tort and criminal cases compared to those inflicted in
the relevant category of contractual suits is that the former are caused
by morally blameworthy or wrongful agents. By contrast, it is far from
clear that economic agents, even when they behave in exploitative and
highly self-serving behavior, are to blame for the harms they cause (not
including conduct by such actors deemed tortious or criminal). Harms
resulting from morally blameworthy conduct warrant greater concern
than harms caused by blameless agents, and thus generate stronger reasons for state-authorized corrective and punitive action.2 06 Part of the
explanation for these differences in moral responsibility concerns our
unique conventions and cultural expectations for economic actorsissues to be discussed later in this subsection. The imposition of duties
and obligations in contracts disputes does not generally carry implications of blame or punishment.
Because the harms to individuals are less severe, it makes sense that
any pre-conventional moral duties or prohibitions that we might have
owed to one another in contractual exchange will be relatively flexible
in the face of a convention or general practice of doing less than what
pre-conventional moral norms require, especially when the existence of
such conventions results in overall societal good. Certain foundational
moral norms (the prohibition against torture, for instance) have a
rigidity that, in the extreme, gives rise to inviolable rights-i.e., rights
that generally cannot by justifiably compromised based on considera204. See, e.g., Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1973).
205. See Gergen, supra note 7373.
206. See generally Seana V. Shiffrin, Harm and its Moral Significance, 18 LEcAL
357 (2012).
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tions of overall, societal good. The norms governing reasonableness
and fairness in contractual terms are unlikely to be rigid in this way in
light of the harms at stake.
Moreover, it is quite likely that the standards for appropriate and
inappropriate behavior in the market context have shifted in light of
our cultural practice of tolerating and even encouraging unbridled selfinterest in the marketplace. 207 Capitalistic societies encourage the
relentless pursuit of material gain out of a sense that it promotes the
general good.20 8 The dominant view amongst economic historians is
that law and culture have strongly shaped participants' sense of what is
and is not appropriate in the market domain, and so long as we can
trust this collective sense of the unique "morals of the marketplace," it
favors a convention-based account of the norms at play.2 09
Conventional-displacement or alteration of the moral landscape in
the contractual arena sets up a kind of feedback loop, where the existence of fairly wide-spread conventions of doing less than what is preconventionally thought to be decent behavior affects the nature and
gravity of the harms when parties fail to act decently. Once the marketplace becomes a domain in which it is well-known that ordinary moral
norms of decency and kindness are relaxed, parties incur an obligation
to recognize and guard against the risk of exploitation when they voluntarily participate in market exchange. Relatedly, participants can be
said to impliedly consent to the risk of being harmed by the self-interested and even highly predatory behavior of others. So long as persons
engaged in economic exchange should anticipate and guard against
207. See, e.g., Jo-N K. GALBRAITH, A HISTORY OF ECONOMICS: THE PAST AS THE PREa marked
37 (1987) (noting that the emergence of "[m]ercantilism involved ...
break with the ethical attitudes and instructions of Aristotle and of Saint Thomas Aquinas
and the Middle Ages in general"); ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE NATURE AND LoGic OF
CAPITALISM (1985) (comparing norms of pre-capitalist and capitalist society); ALAN
WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER?: SOCIAL SCIENCE & MORAL OBLIGATION (1989) (arguing that modSENT

ern economic systems have supplanted traditional moral norms); HarryJ. Glasbeek, Commercial Morality Through CapitalistLaw: Limited Possibilities, 27 Le REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS

263, 303 (1993) ("The ideological power, and legal acceptance, of the primacy of selfishness and
restraints,
was truly
Mitchell,

the merits of a utilitarian approach to public policy-making ensures weak
that is, weak regulation."); id. at 306 (noting the "advent of capitalist relations
revolutionary" with respect to the norms of market exchange); Lawrence E.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1477,

1484-85 (1993); Christopher Calvo, Responsibility, Ethics and American Economic Thought,
1776-1900, History of Corporate Responsibility Project Working Paper No. #7 (2011)
(noting the impact of theJacksonian era market revolution on economic culture). Cf St.
ECONOMIC THOUGHT 60 (Arthur Eli Monroe
ed., 1945) (arguing that it is impossible for buyers and sellers not to fall into sin); JAMES

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in EARLY

DAVIS, MEDIEVAL MARKET MORALITY: LIFE, LAW AND ETHICS IN THE ENGLISH MARKETPLACE,

1200-1500 (2012).
208. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 508 (1937) ("The natural effort of every
individual to better his own condition . . . is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and
without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and
prosperity. . . .").

209. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928); Lee v. LPP Mortgage.
Ltd., 74 P.3d 152, 162 (Wyo. 2003) ("We have said that the relationship between a lender
and its customer is contractual in nature so we impose no duties higher than the morals
of the marketplace.").
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the predatory behavior of others, the harms suffered by parties due to
unconscionable contracts have a diminished significance. Consider
again the mortgagor who is tied to a possibly unconscionable contract
that requires foreclosure despite considerable payments made towards
her home. In one sense, a court's willingness to bail out the mortgagor
by finding the contract procedurally or substantively unconscionable
involves a willingness to help out potentially irresponsible risk-takers.
One need not be a shill for the economically powerful to see that, as far
as empathetic victims go, those who suffer in the market place at the
hands of genuinely selfish and predatory actors are less sympathetic victims than those who have been subjected to another's unexpected negligence or malice. Outside the marketplace, it is implausible to assume
that we have collectively consented to a system of social organization
where parties can inflict dangerous risks to physical and mental health
on one another.
This overarching theory of contractual norms delivers a prediction:
if it is true that judges are in the business of enforcing conventiondependent norms rather than pre-conventional morality, we should
expect to find that judicial interpretation of concepts like unconscionability might fail to jibe with people's ordinary sense of interpersonal
morality. And that is indeed what we find. There is a large quantity of
scholarship pointing out the wide gap between ordinary notions of what
is morally unconscionable and what judges deem unconscionable. 2 1 0
Some critics take this tension to reveal a failing on the part of courts to
apply the law of contractual unconscionability correctly. 2 ' But there is
a way of making sense of what judges are doing that both acknowledges
the authentic moral intuitions of these critics while also charitably interpreting the holdings. Judges are not in the business of enforcing preconventional moral standards of fairness and justice because, plausibly,
these do not apply in a context where exploitative behavior is tolerated
for the general good. Courts can be viewed as enforcing less familiar
210. See Radin, supra note 82; Glasbeek, supra note 207, at 292; Leff, supra note 82;
Daniel T. Ostas, Predicting UnconscionabilityDecisions: An Economic Model and an Empirical

Test, 29 Am. Bus. L.J. 535, 583 (1992) ("Unconscionability decisions mix radical rhetoric
with conservative actions."). Notably, when parties to a contract are merchants in a commercial setting, courts invoke a "presumption of conscionability." See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v.
Graphic Mgmt. Servs. Inc., 959 F.Supp.2d 311, 320 (W.D.N.Y. 2013); Cayuga Harvester,
Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 617 (N.Y.S.2d 1983) ("[C]ontract[s] in a
commercial setting [ ] [have] a presumption of conscionability . . . .").
211. See Nancy S. Kim, WRAP CONTRACTS: FoUNDVxnONs & RAmIFICATIONs 88, 207-09
(2013) (critiquing courts' failure to rein in unfair contracts); Browne & Biksacky, supra
note 88, at 250 ("[I]n cases where factors suggest unconscionability, judges still rule
against unconscionability and implicitly evoke Adam Smith's laissez-faire statement:
'Every man, [so] long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to
pursue his own interest [in] his own way . . . .') (alteration in original); id. at 250-54
(discussing cases where the authors believe courts should have found contracts unconscionable); Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism-TheSliding Scale

Approach to Unconscionability,44 Lov. U. Cn. LJ. 1, 4 (2012); Price, supra note 3, at 744
("Examination of the case law decided under section 2-302 will demonstrate that the matter-of-law mandate has resulted in badly-reasoned decisions on the issue of unconscionability .... ).
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and less demanding standards of interpersonal fairness. The routine
emphasis one finds in judicial opinions on the distinctive "morality of
the marketplace" supports this view. 212 There are other, more general
features of contract law that reinforce the conventional view of contractual norms. There is, for instance, the widely-discussed tolerance in
contract law of efficient breach. 2 13 Parties to a contract can refuse to
perform their contractual obligations, in which case they are only
obliged to pay expectation damages, rather than being compelled to
perform. This strikes many as evidence of the law's tolerance for promise-breaking. 2 14 As a number of writers have argued, however, ordinary
norms of promise-keeping plausibly do not apply in the contractual
context.2 15 Another telling feature of contract law is the absence of
punitive damages and the reluctance of judges to express moral condemnation of actors, except in contexts where a party's conduct is tortious or criminal (as in the case of fraud). 2 16
There is ample basis, then, for the common law to treat normative
questions in contract law as convention-dependent and, hence, as questions of law to be decided byjudges. The grounds include (i) the lesser
prototypical harms at stake, (ii) the essential role of non-legal conventions and judicial practice in defining what counts as "reasonable" economic behavior, and (iii) the wide-spread legal and cultural promotion
of uniquely self-interested behavior in economic exchange. At the very
least, these factors render plausible an explanation in terms of our overarching framework of why the common law treats normative questions
arising in the torts and criminal context differently from those pertaining to contractual reasonableness and unconscionability. Moreover,
the analysis suggests a general recipe for determining whether a type of
normative question is one of law or of fact. Courts might begin by
examining what typically turns on the normative question-in particular, the gravity of harms that the relevant norms aim to prevent. If the
harms are less serious, courts should consider whether conventions,
including law-related conventions, might have altered the normative
landscape making our pre-conventional, ordinary sense of fairness and
justice a poor guide to answering the normative question.
212.

See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928); Lee, 74 P.3d at 162; see

also Browne & Biksacky, supra note 88.
213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (Am. LAW INST.
1981); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency,
24 RUTGERS L. REv. 273 (1970).
214. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of
Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in ContractLaw, 93 CAL. L. REv. 975, 1012-13

(2005); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897).
215. See, e.g., Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New
Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REv. 1939, 1982 (2011) (rejecting the notion
that efficient breach cannot be squared with promissory morality); Steven Shavell, Is
Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY LJ. 439 (2006).
216. See RESTAxEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981); Laurence P. Simpson,
Punitive Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 284 (1959) (arguing that punishment has no place in commercial transactions).
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The framework provides a helpful lens from which to view other
developments. Recall the decision in Cooper Industries, where the
Supreme Court held that the appropriateness of punitive damages in a
case involving unfair competition/false advertising could be reviewed
de novo as a finding intermediate between law and fact. The Court
emphasized the moral condemnation involved in punitive damages
awards.2 17 The dissent was keen to emphasize that moral findings are
routinely treated as factual and reviewed deferentially as in negligence
law. 218 What Cooper Industries left unsaid is that the moral question of
appropriate punishment in the context of essentially economic conduct
like unfair competition can only be answered by considering the
unique morals of the marketplace, which, as discussed, are shaped by
conventions. This makes the moral question of appropriate punishment law-like. In other words, squaring Cooper Industries with the wider
case law on normative questions and the law/fact distinction involves
deploying the framework of convention-dependent and conventionindependent normativity.
C.

ExplainingIntertemporal Shifts: The Cases of Obscenity,
Malice, and Aggravation

An aspect of the puzzle concerning normative questions was the
inconsistent treatment of such questions under the law/fact distinction
over time. A theory of the distinction needs to explain such changes. If
the shifts are to be explained in terms ofjudicial error, we need a plausible account of why judges might have gotten things wrong. Alternatively, what is needed is an account of the changes in the world on
which the factual or legal status of these questions has turned.
The present framework sheds important light on these changes,
beginning with the case of a factual question that comes to be regarded
as legal, or in-between legal and factual. The question of whether a
false statement was made with "malicious intent" or "reckless disregard
for the truth" was historically a question of fact for the jury, in both
criminal and civil defamation cases under English as well as American
common law.2 19 After the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan-

requiring a finding of actual malice before punitive damages can be
awarded to public official claimants-appellate courts began reviewing
the issue de novo. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,

the Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the widespread use of de novo
appellate review of the "actual malice" question, noting "'the vexing
217.

Cooper Indus. Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).

218. Id. at 446 ("But there can be no question that a jury's verdict on punitive
damages is fundamentally dependent on determinations we characterize as factfindingse.g., . . . whether the defendant behaved negligently, recklessly, or maliciously.") (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
219. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 517
("In my view the problem results from the Court's attempt to treat what is here, and in
other contexts always has been, a pure question of fact, as something more than a fact-a
so-called 'constitutional fact."') (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); discussion supra Part I.C.
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nature' of [the law/fact] distinction . . . ."220 The Court ruled that the
question of whether a false statement was made maliciously was intermediate between law and fact-"a constitutional fact"-given the
important First Amendment value at stake (a finding of actual malice
licenses punishment of the speech in question).221 Multiple scholars
have since pointed out that it is hard to find a principled basis for the
Court's treatment of the issue, given its disinclination to treat as constitutional facts other traditionally factual questions on which important
222
constitutional rights hang.
On the present reading, the change in classification of the normative question-was the intent to publish a false statement sufficiently
malicious and/or reckless to license punishment?-can be understood
in terms of a cultural shift in our attitudes towards reputational harm
(the kind of injury that defamation law seeks to prevent). As Robert
Post writes, "defamation law presupposes an image of how people are
tied together, or should be tied together, in a social setting. As this
image varies, so will the nature of the reputation that the law of defamation
seeks to protect."2 23 Post goes on to observe that American society has
grown increasingly skeptical of the notion, popular in what he calls
"deference societies," that harm to a person's reputation or honor is a
2 24
That is, reputational harm used
matter of grave moral importance.
to be conceived in terms of personal dignity and fundamental right.
This dignitarian view of reputational harm-with its presuppositions
regarding fundamental morality-was supplanted with an economic
view, on which a person is harmed by attacks on their reputation only
insofar as it prevents them from acquiring property. "Contemporary
Americans are uneasy with the concept of honor" but "they are inti2 25
mately comfortable with the concept of property."
Why would a cultural shift from treating reputational harm as an
affront to a person's dignity to treating it as a mere economic injury
help explain the changed law/fact status of the "actual malice" question? When reputational harm was viewed as very serious, it made sense
for the law to draw on convention-independent moral concepts in specifying normative conditions on punishment. The question of malice
was treated as factual (convention-independent) in light of the presumed relevance of pre-conventional moral concepts of malice and
reckless disregard to the question of what ought to be punished and
how much in the context of defamation. However, as the harms from
malicious defamation (in the pre-conventional moral sense) come to be
viewed as less serious, the relevance of pre-conventional moral norms to
220. Bose, 466 U.S. at 501-02.
221. Id. at 517-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
222. See sources cited supra note 110.
223. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundationsof Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REv. 691, 693 (1986) (emphasis added).
224. Id. at 702.
225. Id. at 726. In the early 20th century, the moral harm of defamation weighed
more heavily than First Amendment values. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (exempting defamatory speech from constitutional protection given
the "social interest in order and morality").
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the question of what defamation law should punish becomes less obvious. The harm from malicious defamation begins to look increasingly
susceptible to trade-off and balancing against benefits incurred from
the law's tolerating such harms to promote free speech. Accordingly,
courts reasonably responded by supplanting a convention-independent
normative concept of "actual malice" with a convention-dependent one
(defined in part by our law-related conventions including judicial interpretation of the concept).
What was once perceived as a convention-independent normative
question comes to be seen as legal convention-dependent precisely
because of our evolving understanding of the relevant moral facts. 226 A
similar account can be given of other areas of First Amendment law
where courts have employed the "constitutional fact" doctrine to treat a
normative question historically regarded as factual more like a legal
question. In the case of obscenity law, the questions of whether a publication is "obscene" or "patently offensive" have come to be treated as
constitutional questions requiring de novo review despite having been
historically treated as paradigmatic questions of fact for the jury that
were reviewed deferentially. 22 7 Similarly, the question of whether provocative speech is so "inherently inflammatory" as to count as "fighting
words" which are likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, receives de novo review.
It is tempting to think that this entire area of law has been influenced by evolving societal attitudes towards the relevant sorts of
harm.22 8 In a society that takes harms caused by obscenity very seriously, the law will take its cue from pre-conventional morality in deciding what kind of speech to prohibit or protect. However, once the
harms come to be seen as less serious, it no longer makes sense for the
law to closely track pre-conventional moral concepts of obscenity.
Accordingly, legal actors respond by supplanting convention-independent moral concepts in First Amendment law, those based on the ordinary sense of right and wrong or basic conceptions of human dignity,
with concepts that are at least in part shaped by convention (what we
find or judge to be obscene). Note that on such a view the law's treatment over time of normative questions under the law/fact distinction
far from being unprincipled is responsive to changes in our under226. Unsurprisingly, we find the Court minimizing the significance of reputational
harm in its rulings and continuing to interpret the "actual malice" condition on punishment in increasingly demanding ways. See, e.g., Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper,
134 S. Ct. 852, 861 (2014) ("[W]e have required more than mere falsity to establish actual
malice: The falsity must be 'material.'") (citations omitted); Post, supra note 223, at
736-38 (citing cases ofjudicial discomfort with the notion of reputational harm as harm

to dignity).
227. See discussion supra Part I.C.
228. See Dennis Chong, Tolerance and Social Adjustment to New Norms and Practices, 16
POL. BEi-iAv. 21, 35 (1994) (noting that the Supreme Court's late 1950s decisions limiting
the reach of obscenity statutes coincided with the sexual revolution); Harold T. Christensen & Christina F. Gregg, Changing Sex Norms in America and Scandinavia, 32 J. oF MARRIAGE & FAMILY 616 (1970) (noting that attitudes towards sex liberalized considerably

during the 50s and 60s).
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standing of the normative truths relevant to these questions. What
drives the treatment of issues under the law/fact distinction, then, is
our (evolving) understanding of what is or is not morally fundamental
or open to compromise-as it should be. The resulting account of
transitions in law/fact classification may be one of error and correction,
but, importantly, the need for such corrections stems from the complexity of the moral terrain and not from incoherence in the classificatory scheme.
Compare the present analysis of the "constitutional fact" doctrine
with one that treats the importance of the constitutional values at stake
as the principle grounds for the classification. The latter view falters in
part because of the implausibility of viewing the constitutional values at
stake as less important in areas where the Court has refused to review
normative questions de novo, such as in the case of racial discrimination, as discussed earlier. 2 29 There is a different angle from which to
approach the doctrine, one that emphasizes the relative importance (or
unimportance) of pre-conventional/fundamental morality in deciding
a normative issue. That factor appears to be a key driver of the doctrine's invocation. Pre-conventional moral concepts and norms appear
more relevant in cases where the Court has refused to invoke the doctrine. In discrimination cases for instance, the normative question of
whether the defendant was wrongfully discriminated against is appropriately answered by appeal to pre-conventional moral concepts of discrimination on the basis of race and morally arbitrary features.
Let us turn to cases where what were previously questions of law
come to be treated as factual questions, as in the case of normative
questions in death penalty cases, like the existence of mitigating and
aggravating factors.23 0 Is it plausible that the convention-independence of the "death-eligibility" question simply escaped judges for so
long? The notion that even the worst criminal offenders might have a
basic dignity unsuited for a punishment as severe as the death penalty is
a relatively modern one. 23 1 More generally, fundamental moral rights
are frequently overlooked; one glimpse at the long-tolerated practice of
2 32
So long as convention-indeslavery is sufficient to confirm this fact.
pendent moral facts can be elusive, judges may incorrectly classify as
229. See discussion supra Part I.C.
230. Id.
231. The Court's death penalty jurisprudence is based on the Eighth Amendment,
which "draw(s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," and in the past twelve years alone, capital punishment has
been outlawed for the mentally handicapped, for minors, and for crimes other than murder and treason-all to bring our sentencing practices into alignment with the evolving
moral standards of the citizenry. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Kennedy
v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (abolishing the death penalty for the rape of a child
where the death of the victim was neither the result nor the intent); Roper v. Simmons,

543 U.S. 551 (2005) (abolishing the death penalty for individuals under the age of eighteen at the time of their capital crimes); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (abolishing the death penalty for the mentally retarded).
232. On our bad track record with ensuring fundamental rights generally, see Evan.
G. Williams, The Possibility of an Ongoing Moral Catastrophe, 18 ETHiCAL TI-IEORY & MORAL

PRAc. 971 (2015).
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questions of law some normative questions that are decisively determined by pre-conventional moral facts, like the question of whether
sufficiently many aggravating factors are present in a defendant's case
to warrant consideration of the death penalty.
Our charge was either to explain based on the overarching framework how historically changing law/fact classifications were not the
result of judicial error, or else to explain how these errors could happen. I have offered both kinds of explanation. Whether a normative
question raised at trial should be classified as a question of law or fact is
vexing precisely because the relevance of conventions is not always obvious. Correct application of the law/fact distinction depends on the
entirely non-trivial issue of whether and to what extent legal outcomes,
in various domains of law, turn on fundamental moral norms; and the
boundary between fundamental morality and law can be elusive. Once
this complexity is appreciated, we can no longer move so easily from
the fact that judges change their minds about the law/fact status of normative questions that arise at trial to skepticism about the distinction's
analytic coherence vis-a-vis normative questions. It is not always easy to
determine whether a normative question is convention-dependent and
so legal or convention-independent and thus factual.
IV.

A FRAMEWORK FOR SIXTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: DOES THE
"LIFE-TO-DEATH" JUDICIAL OVERRIDE INFRINGE ON
THE JURY'S FACT-FINDING RESPONSIBILITY?

The aim of this Article so far has been descriptive-to bring to the
fore a principle implicit in courts' classification of normative issues as
legal and factual.2 33 I conclude with an application of the principle to
an ongoing controversy. The controversy concerns the constitutionality
of the 'judicial override"-a legal mechanism still used by Alabama
judges to override jury life-sentences in capital trials.2 34 The "life-todeath" judicial override presents a constitutional puzzle that the
Supreme Court has been grappling with over the last few decades, and
as recently as January of 2016, when it decided, in Hurst v. Florida, to
strike down similar override provisions in Florida's capital sentencing
scheme.2 3 5 This scheme of capital sentencing seems headed for constitutional prohibition, given recent developments in the Court's death
penalty jurisprudence, not limited to its special emphasis on the jury's
fact-finding responsibility in capital trials.2 3 6 The aim, in what follows,
233. In this paper, I haven't provided a detailed causal mechanism by which the
meta-normative distinction I've described might have influenced judges. One possibility
is that judges have assigned normative questions to juries when they feel that they lack
legal tools to decide the question- that is, when they feel out of their element. Common
law judges are more likely to feel out of their element when they confront questions of
basic morality, as opposed to normative questions that they can decide based on conventions. Thanks to Joshua Kleinfeld for this suggestion.
234.

See Alabama Ends Death Penalty by judicial Overide, supra note 42.

235.
236.

136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
See discussion infra Part W.A.
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is to suggest that the constitutional question may turn on a proper
understanding of the law/fact distinction.
A.

The Supreme Court's Recent Death Penalty Jurisprudence
and the Judicial Overnide

Capital sentencing schemes across all states that have the death
penalty follow the same basic structure. They require three findings
before a defendant can be lawfully sentenced to death: (i) a finding of
aggravating factors in the defendant's case; (ii) a finding of mitigating
factors; and (iii) a balancing of aggravating against mitigating factors
based on the "weight" of each. 2 37 A convicted defendant can lawfully
receive the death penalty only if the aggravating factors are found to
outweigh the mitigating factors. Aggravating factors might include
multiple victims killed or injured in the course of committing the murder, prior convictions, or a lack of remorse. 238 Mitigating factors may
include mental impairment, childhood abuse or neglect, and
remorse.2 3 9 Judicial override provisions grant authority to the trial
judge to override a jury's determination of aggravating and mitigating
factors' existence or weight. Prior to Hurst, only three states-Indiana,
Delaware, and Alabama-had override provisions in their capital sentencing schemes. 240
In Hurst, decided only last year, the Court held that Florida's override scheme at the time violated the crucial holding in Ring,24 1 that in
capital cases any fact that exposes the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict must be submitted
to ajury 242 The Hurst Court found that the existence of an aggravating
factor is a "fact that exposes the defendant to a greater punishment"
and so must be found by the jury.2 43 The jury's merely "advisory verdict" on the existence of aggravating factors was deemed not to satisfy
Ring's requirements.
Whereas Alabama's scheme of judicial overrides avoids the problem found in Florida's-namely, the judge's ability to independently
find aggravating factors-it nevertheless empowers judges to have the
244
final say in weighing the aggravating against the mitigating factors.
Judges, in other words, can override the jury on the ultimate determination of whether death is the appropriate sentence. Moreover, in Alabama, the judge's overriding discretion is much less constrained than in
237. Modern sentencing schemes stem from the requirements outlined in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 153 (1976). See also Abramson, supra note 117, at 153.
238. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A § 3592 (2006).
239. Id.
240. See Michael L. Radelet, OverridingJurySentencingRecommendations in FloridaCapital Cases: An Update and Possible Half-Requiem, 2011 MicH. ST. L. REV. 793, 818 (2011)
(listing overrides in Indiana); id. at 822-23 (listing overrides in Florida); id. at 825-27
(listing overrides in Alabama).

241.
242.
243.
244.

Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 617 (2016).
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 616.
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39 to -59 (2012).
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Florida. 24 5 The jury's findings and recommendations need not be
given any particular weight by the sentencing judge. All that the state
requires is that the judge "consider" the advisory verdict.2 46 Given this
broad discretion afforded to judges, Alabama is the only state where
judges continue to routinely override jury life sentences. Between 1981
and 2011, ninety-three defendants were sentenced to death after the
jury recommended life imprisonment.2 4 7 Since 2000, twenty-six of the
twenty-seven life-to-death overrides in the United States have occurred
in Alabama alone.2 48
On April 11th, 2017, Alabama governor Kay Ivey signed into law a
bill banning the judicial override for defendants convicted after April
11th, but the law does not apply retroactively to defendants convicted
prior to that date. 2 49 Judges remain free to exercise the override for
prior murder convictions. Accordingly, the legislation will not affect
the 183 inmates currently on Alabama's death row and those due to be
sentenced based on pre-April 11th convictions.2 50
In Harrisv. Alabama, decided prior to Ring, Apprendi, and Hurst, the
Supreme Court explicitly upheld Alabama's override scheme. 2 5 ' However, there is increasing evidence that some justices are prepared to
review the Court's earlier decision. While the justices recently denied
certiorari in a 2016 appeal that would have allowed them to reconsider
the constitutionality of Alabama's override in light of Hurst, Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor wrote a concurrence clarifying that the
denial, in their minds, was not based on the merits of the issue but was
instead due to procedural constraints in the case preventing relief. 2 52
Moreover, they openly suggested that Alabama's capital sentence
scheme is due a rehearing based on recent developments in the Court's
capital jurisprudence on jury fact-finding.2 5 3 The justices noted that
Harris, which upheld Alabama's override, was based on cases that Hurst
overruled.25 4

245. The Florida Supreme Court articulated, in Tedder v. State, what has come to be
known as the "Tedder standard," which requires that "[i]n order to sustain a sentence of
death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death
should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." 322
So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). Nothing comparable to the Tedder standard constrains
judges in Alabama.
246. See Radelet, supra note 240, at 809.
247. Id. at 801-02.
248. Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 407 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
249. See sources cited supra note 42.
250. Id.
251. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
252. Brooks v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 708 (2016) (Sotomayor,J., concurring in denial
of certiorari).
253. Id.
254. Id.
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Alabama's judicial Overnide on the Weight of
Aggravating & MitigatingEvidence

Can Alabama's override scheme withstand the ruling in Hurst
requiring that "any fact that expose [s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict . . . must be
submitted to the jury"? The issue is complicated by the fact that Hurst
dealt specifically with the practice of judges independently finding
aggravatingfactors and thus deciding the death-eligibility issue. But a
determination that particular aggravating factors exist is distinct from a
finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors-or,
in other words, the ultimate finding that the defendant should receive
the death penalty. The critical question, then, is whether in light of
Hurst and related cases, judges can still independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors and make the ultimate sentencing decision over the jury.
Justices Sotomayor and Breyer have suggested that the answer is
no-judicial determination of the ultimate sentence, whether based on
the jury's advice or not, unlawfully infringes on the jury's power to
25 5
They could not have stated
decide questions of fact in capital cases.
their position more clearly than in their 2013 dissent from a certiorari
denial. The case involved an Alabama judge overriding ajury's eight-tofour life sentence recommendation after independently finding that
the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. The justices
observed:
The statutorily required finding that the aggravating factors of a
defendant's crime outweigh the mitigating factors is therefore
necessary to impose the death penalty. It is clear, then, that this
factual finding exposes the defendant to a greater punishment
than he would otherwise receive: death, as opposed to life without
parole. Under Apprendi and Ring, a finding that has such an effect
2 56
must be made by a jury.
Whether other members of the Court agree remains to be seen, but the
position requires a more detailed examination, one that I provide
below.
Quite apart from the law/fact issue, there are various constitutional principles that seem to be in tension with Alabama's sentencing
scheme. The override is hard to square with the Court's broader death
penalty jurisprudence, which emphasizes, among other things, (1) the
need for death sentences to enjoy broad-based communal support in
25 7
and (2) the
order to be consistent with the Eighth Amendment,
need for capital sentencing procedures to guard against arbitrariness in
255. Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 410-11 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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death sentencing. 258 Shannon Heery makes a compelling empirical
case that judicial overrides make death sentencing more arbitrary than
it would otherwise be in states like Alabama.2 59 Precisely because the
overall case against the constitutionality of the override seems so strong,
a number of commenters expect the Court to strike it down. 260 But it is
worth clarifying the rationale for doing so based on the jury's fact-finding responsibility in light of the law/fact distinction.
C.

The Weighing of Aggravating and MitigatingFactors Raises a
Convention-independent ("Factual") Normative Question

Justices Sotomayor and Breyer are quite right that the ultimate
determination that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors is a question of fact for the jury. But this does not simply fall out of
Hurst's requirement that all "facts" raising the likelihood of a severer
sentence must be found by the jury. The Court emphasized in Ring
that the scope of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right turns on the
understanding of the jury's role that prevailed at the time of the
Amendment's adoption. 2 61 It cited approvingly the work of Welsh
White, who observes that English legal scholars and the common law
understanding of the distinction between legal questions and factual
questions "undoubtedly influenced the framers."2 6 2 White cites Blackstone, who explicitly appeals to the law/fact distinction in delineating
the jury's authority in civil and criminal cases.26 3 Moreover, the distinction's relevance is well-established under the Court's interpretation of
the Seventh Amendment jury trial right. Jury trial rights under the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments have been implemented in coordinate
fashion and have been understood to serve similar societal functions. 264
Accordingly, a "finding of fact," under Hurst, can reasonably be interpreted as referring to the law's traditional understanding of factual as
opposed to legal questions. Under this line of reasoning, even if the
capital sentencing judge's final determination that the defendant
deserves the death penalty obviously "increases the likelihood of a more
258.
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severe penalty," it does not violate Hurstunless it also represents a "finding of fact" as opposed to a "finding of law."
Whether the final determination is factual is not obvious. For one,
it rests on a normative evaluation-a weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. The final weighing of the evidence represents an "ethical judgment," and in the "final analysis, capital punishment rests on
not a legal but an ethical judgment-an assessment of . .. the 'moral
guilt' of the defendant."26 5 As previously discussed, there are many
examples of normative questions that have historically been treated as
questions of law, as in contract law. 266 To consider an especially pertinent example, in CooperIndustries, the Court held that punitive damages
findings in the context of unfair competition are intermediate between
law and fact, emphasizing precisely the normative character of such
findings.26 7 Hence, the application of Hurst-and the RingApprendi
line of cases on which it builds-to the life-to-death judicial override
turns crucially on whether the normative evaluation that ultimately
determines a death sentence is factual as opposed to legal.
To put the issue in terms of the present framework, the question is
whether the normative truths pertaining to the weight of the relevant
evidence are convention-dependent or convention-independent. In
the case of punitive damages in the economic context, it is very plausible to think that law-related conventions have a role to play in determining whether conduct should be punished financially. It is far less
plausible to think that the question of whether a criminal defendant
deserves the death penalty based on the facts about his crime and his
circumstance turns in any significant way on our conventions-how
26 8
Conventions
judges treat similarly situated defendants, for instance.
cannot favor the imposition of the death penalty where the penalty is
morally undeserved, given the gravity of the harm inflicted and the
269
importance of protecting defendants from undeserved execution.
by
settled
be
must
question
penalty
death
the
An affirmative answer to
morally weighing the particular facts in the defendant's case and considering whether the death penalty would be consistent with the fundamental rights of persons. 270 In other words, Alabama's override
scheme is inconsistent with Hurst because it empowers the judge, alone,
to rule on a convention-independent normative question, or a question of
fundamental moral fact. Once the nature of the normative question is
properly understood, Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and the logic of
the law/fact distinction can be seen to support the conclusion that the
life-to-death judicial override unconstitutionally impinges on the jury's
fact-finding responsibility in criminal trials.
265.
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The Court might find it advantageous to rely on an apolitical rule
in deciding the issue, given that capital sentencing continues to be morally and politically contested. As such an apolitical rule, the common
law's distinguishing of legal from factual normative questions, combined with a straightforward application of the Court's recent holdings,
seems a powerful basis on which to eliminate the life-to death override.
CONCLUSION

Leon Green once observed that "[n]o two terms of legal science
have rendered better service than 'law' and 'fact,"' given the many uses
to which they have been put, and, so, warned that "the man who could
succeed in defining them would be a public enemy." 27 1 Green's warning, while partly ironic, touches on a legitimate concern one might
have about attempts to define legal terms and distinctions. Definitions
impose constraints which, when artificial, can rob legal distinctions of
the flexibility that made them useful to judges in the first place. But the
importance of objective constraints on judicial discretion that can be
specified ex ante is equally worthy of emphasis: they are essential to the
rule of law. 2 72 Walking the thin line between these two concerns, I
have sought to offer not a full definition of "law" and "fact," but an
intuitive principle that can inform the classification of normative questions under the distinction. The principle should promote the integrity
of law in this domain, while respecting the reality of judicial judgment.
Simply put, normative questions that essentially depend on conventions-what we do around here-and the practices of legal officials in
particular, are aptly described as "questions of law"; normative questions that are primarily independent of such conventions because they
turn on what we ought to do as a matter of basic justice are better
described as questions of fact. This principle explains settled law/fact
classifications in a broad range of legal domains, including torts, contracts, First Amendment law, and criminal procedure. It also points
towards a possible solution to a looming controversy over judicial
involvement in capital sentencing.
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